{"title":"什么是语言表征?","authors":"David Adger","doi":"10.1111/mila.12407","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Linguistic representations are taken by some to be representations of some-thing, specifically of standard linguistic entities (SLEs), such as phonemes, clauses, noun phrases, and so forth. This perspective takes them to be intentional. Rey (2020) further argues that the SLEs themselves are inexistent. Here I argue that linguistic representations are simply structures, abstractions of brain states, and hence not intentional, and show how they never-theless connect to the systems that use them.","PeriodicalId":110770,"journal":{"name":"Mind & Language","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2022-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"3","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"What are linguistic representations?\",\"authors\":\"David Adger\",\"doi\":\"10.1111/mila.12407\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Linguistic representations are taken by some to be representations of some-thing, specifically of standard linguistic entities (SLEs), such as phonemes, clauses, noun phrases, and so forth. This perspective takes them to be intentional. Rey (2020) further argues that the SLEs themselves are inexistent. Here I argue that linguistic representations are simply structures, abstractions of brain states, and hence not intentional, and show how they never-theless connect to the systems that use them.\",\"PeriodicalId\":110770,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Mind & Language\",\"volume\":\"10 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-04-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"3\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Mind & Language\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12407\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Mind & Language","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12407","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Linguistic representations are taken by some to be representations of some-thing, specifically of standard linguistic entities (SLEs), such as phonemes, clauses, noun phrases, and so forth. This perspective takes them to be intentional. Rey (2020) further argues that the SLEs themselves are inexistent. Here I argue that linguistic representations are simply structures, abstractions of brain states, and hence not intentional, and show how they never-theless connect to the systems that use them.