原始SYN:查找隐藏在防火墙后面的机器

Xu Zhang, Jeffrey Knockel, Jedidiah R. Crandall
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引用次数: 26

摘要

我们提出了一种Internet测量技术,用于查找隐藏在防火墙后面的机器。也就是说,如果防火墙阻止外部IP地址向只能在本地网络上访问的内部受保护机器发送数据包,我们的技术仍然可以找到该机器。我们采用了一种新颖的TCP/IP侧信道技术来实现这一点。该技术使用“僵尸”机器中的侧通道,从僵尸的角度学习网络信息。与以前的TCP/IP侧通道技术不同,我们的技术不需要高数据包速率,也不会导致拒绝服务。我们也没有对全局递增的ipid做任何假设,空闲扫描也是如此。本文解决了关于我们技术的两个关键问题:互联网上有多少机器隐藏在防火墙后面,以及通过不允许欺骗的IP数据包进入网络来阻止我们扫描的入口过滤有多普遍。我们分别通过找到1296台隐藏的机器并测量只有23.9%的候选僵尸机器在执行入口过滤的网络上来回答这两个问题。
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Original SYN: Finding machines hidden behind firewalls
We present an Internet measurement technique for finding machines that are hidden behind firewalls. That is, if a firewall prevents outside IP addresses from sending packets to an internal protected machine that is only accessible on the local network, our technique can still find the machine. We employ a novel TCP/IP side channel technique to achieve this. The technique uses side channels in “zombie” machines to learn information about the network from the perspective of a zombie. Unlike previous TCP/IP side channel techniques, our technique does not require a high packet rate and does not cause denial-of-service. We also make no assumptions about globally incrementing IPIDs, as do idle scans. This paper addresses two key questions about our technique: how many machines are there on the Internet that are hidden behind firewalls, and how common is ingress filtering that prevents our scan by not allowing spoofed IP packets into the network. We answer both of these questions, respectively, by finding 1,296 hidden machines and measuring that only 23.9% of our candidate zombie machines are on networks that perform ingress filtering.
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