平衡天平:香港的法定商业判断规则?

Douglas M. Branson, Chee Keong Low
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引用次数: 1

摘要

安然(Enron)和世通(WorldCom)的倒闭,使公司董事作为良好公司治理的“看门人”受到了相当大的关注。他们目前受到越来越多的审查,世界各地最近的许多改革都采用了一种监管理念,其前提是通过强迫公司董事“做X”、“做Y”或“做Z”来保持公司董事的“正直和狭隘”。这种方法假定立法者和监管者具有使商业决策服从系统分析的固有能力,并且未能认识到此类决策通常涉及无形的和直觉的见解。本文试图通过制定一项法定的商业判断规则来平衡有利于董事的规模,为他们提供安全的避风港,这些决策是在没有任何利益冲突的情况下做出的,并充分了解和欣赏重大事实。在这样做的过程中,它将使董事们能够回到资本主义框架内的商业基础,即通过促进合法的商业决策和冒险来促进企业家精神。
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Balancing the Scales: A Statutory Business Judgment Rule for Hong Kong?
The collapse of Enron and WorldCom has focused considerable attention upon the company director as a 'gatekeeper' for good corporate governance. They are presently subject to ever increasing scrutiny and much of the recent reforms around the world have adopted a regulatory philosophy premised on keeping company directors on the 'straight and narrow' by compelling them to 'Do X', 'Do Y' or 'Do Z'. This approach presumes that legislators and regulators have the inherent ability to subject business decisions to systematic analysis and fails to recognize that such decisions often involve intangible and intuitive insights. This article seeks to balance the scales in favor of directors by offering them safe harbor through the enactment of a statutory business judgment rule for decisions that are made without any conflicts of interest and with full knowledge and appreciation of the material facts. In doing so, it will allow directors to get back to the basics of business within a capitalist framework namely, to promote entrepreneurism through the facilitation of legitimate business decisions and risk taking.
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