更好的赏金狩猎:美国证券交易委员会新的举报人计划如何改变证券欺诈集体诉讼辩论

A. Rose
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引用次数: 15

摘要

美国证券交易委员会新的举报人赏金计划引发了重大争议。争议的焦点在于,实施规则未能将通过企业合规部门进行内部报告作为恢复的先决条件。本文以更广泛的视角来探讨新计划,研究其对长期以来关于市场欺诈(FOTM)集体诉讼的辩论的影响。本文展示了赏金计划,如果成功,将如何复制FOTM集体诉讼的欺诈威慑好处,同时增加此类诉讼的成本-使它们成为毫无意义但昂贵的冗余。如果美国证券交易委员会被证明无法有效管理赏金计划,该条款显示了如何将其修改为包括规则10b-5违规的qui team条款将比保留FOTM集体诉讼提供几个优势。不管怎样,赏金计划都有重要的、以前未被认识到的影响,政策制定者不应忽视这些影响。
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Better Bounty Hunting: How the SEC's New Whistleblower Program Changes the Securities Fraud Class Action Debate
The SEC’s new whistleblower bounty program has provoked significant controversy. That controversy has centered on the failure of the implementing rules to make internal reporting through corporate compliance departments a prerequisite to recovery. This Article approaches the new program with a broader lens, examining its impact on the longstanding debate over fraud-on-the-market (FOTM) class actions. The Article demonstrates how the bounty program, if successful, will replicate the fraud deterrence benefits of FOTM class actions while simultaneously increasing the costs of such suits — rendering them a pointless yet expensive redundancy. If instead the SEC proves incapable of effectively administering the bounty program, the Article shows how amending it to include a qui tam provision for Rule 10b-5 violations would offer several advantages over retaining FOTM class actions. Either way, the bounty program has important and previously unrecognized implications that policymakers should not ignore.
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