Feten Slimeni, B. Scheers, V. Le Nir, Zied Chtourou, R. Attia
{"title":"认知无线电网络中针对智能干扰的多信道功率分配学习","authors":"Feten Slimeni, B. Scheers, V. Le Nir, Zied Chtourou, R. Attia","doi":"10.1109/ICMCIS.2016.7496544","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We model the power allocation interaction between a cognitive radio and a jammer as a two-player zero-sum game. First, we determine the power allocation strategy for the cognitive radio using a modified version of the Q-learning algorithm against fixed jamming strategies. The learned anti-jamming strategy will be compared to the common waterfilling technique. Then, we consider the power allocation game using Q-learning for both the cognitive radio and the jammer. The learned strategies will be compared to the Nash equilibrium found under the assumption of perfect knowledge. Finally, we consider the real scenario of a jammer with imperfect information.","PeriodicalId":103155,"journal":{"name":"2016 International Conference on Military Communications and Information Systems (ICMCIS)","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2016-05-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"16","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Learning multi-channel power allocation against smart jammer in cognitive radio networks\",\"authors\":\"Feten Slimeni, B. Scheers, V. Le Nir, Zied Chtourou, R. Attia\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/ICMCIS.2016.7496544\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We model the power allocation interaction between a cognitive radio and a jammer as a two-player zero-sum game. First, we determine the power allocation strategy for the cognitive radio using a modified version of the Q-learning algorithm against fixed jamming strategies. The learned anti-jamming strategy will be compared to the common waterfilling technique. Then, we consider the power allocation game using Q-learning for both the cognitive radio and the jammer. The learned strategies will be compared to the Nash equilibrium found under the assumption of perfect knowledge. Finally, we consider the real scenario of a jammer with imperfect information.\",\"PeriodicalId\":103155,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"2016 International Conference on Military Communications and Information Systems (ICMCIS)\",\"volume\":\"39 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2016-05-23\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"16\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"2016 International Conference on Military Communications and Information Systems (ICMCIS)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/ICMCIS.2016.7496544\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2016 International Conference on Military Communications and Information Systems (ICMCIS)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/ICMCIS.2016.7496544","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Learning multi-channel power allocation against smart jammer in cognitive radio networks
We model the power allocation interaction between a cognitive radio and a jammer as a two-player zero-sum game. First, we determine the power allocation strategy for the cognitive radio using a modified version of the Q-learning algorithm against fixed jamming strategies. The learned anti-jamming strategy will be compared to the common waterfilling technique. Then, we consider the power allocation game using Q-learning for both the cognitive radio and the jammer. The learned strategies will be compared to the Nash equilibrium found under the assumption of perfect knowledge. Finally, we consider the real scenario of a jammer with imperfect information.