The comprehension of victory in the strategic concept of total defence

Small states that base their defence strategy on the concept of total defence, even if they do not defeat a stronger opponent militarily, and in the course of an armed conflict deny the enemy an absolute victory according to their criteria, and at the same time protect their national interests, can consider such an outcome victory. Victory at strategic level is conditioned, and not entirely determined, by military victories at tactical and operational level. Claiming victory at strategic level is a qualitative and political perception of state leaders, while at a lower level it is mostly the subject of quantitative analysis by military commanders. By analysing the content of strategic and doctrinal documents, scientific publications, and then by comparative and historical analysis of the concepts of strategy and victory, their relationship and understanding in different historical eras has been shown. The historical comprehension of victory in the Republic of Serbia since the restoration of statehood in the 19th century until today has been particularly analysed. A multiple study (R. Serbia 1999-2022; Afghanistan 2001-2021; Iraq 2003-2022) in which the defenders' successes were analysed after the attack by an asymmetrically stronger armed force led by the US Armed Forces, has served as the basis for scientific generalisation and making a final statement about victory and the concept of total defence. By understanding that the strategic victory of the weaker in an asymmetric conflict is achieved by relying on armed forces, and above all by the synergy of all elements of national power, the conditions are created to get out of conflicts under favourable conditions with as few human and material losses as possible.