{"title":"量化基础设施共享的好处","authors":"M. Andrews, M. Bradonjic, I. Saniee","doi":"10.1145/3106723.3106734","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We analyze the benefits of network sharing between telecommunications operators. Sharing is seen as one way to speed the roll out of expensive technologies such as 5G since it allows the service providers to divide the cost of providing ubiquitous coverage. Our theoretical analysis focuses on scenarios with two service providers and compares the system dynamics when they are competing with the dynamics when they are cooperating. We show that sharing can be beneficial to a service provider even when it has the power to drive the other service provider out of the market, a byproduct of a non-convex cost function. A key element of this study is an analysis of the competitive equilibria for both cooperative and non-cooperative 2-person games in the presence of (non-convex) cost functions that involve a fixed cost component.","PeriodicalId":130519,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 12th workshop on the Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2017-06-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"4","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Quantifying the benefits of infrastructure sharing\",\"authors\":\"M. Andrews, M. Bradonjic, I. Saniee\",\"doi\":\"10.1145/3106723.3106734\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We analyze the benefits of network sharing between telecommunications operators. Sharing is seen as one way to speed the roll out of expensive technologies such as 5G since it allows the service providers to divide the cost of providing ubiquitous coverage. Our theoretical analysis focuses on scenarios with two service providers and compares the system dynamics when they are competing with the dynamics when they are cooperating. We show that sharing can be beneficial to a service provider even when it has the power to drive the other service provider out of the market, a byproduct of a non-convex cost function. A key element of this study is an analysis of the competitive equilibria for both cooperative and non-cooperative 2-person games in the presence of (non-convex) cost functions that involve a fixed cost component.\",\"PeriodicalId\":130519,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Proceedings of the 12th workshop on the Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation\",\"volume\":\"13 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2017-06-18\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"4\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Proceedings of the 12th workshop on the Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1145/3106723.3106734\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Proceedings of the 12th workshop on the Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3106723.3106734","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Quantifying the benefits of infrastructure sharing
We analyze the benefits of network sharing between telecommunications operators. Sharing is seen as one way to speed the roll out of expensive technologies such as 5G since it allows the service providers to divide the cost of providing ubiquitous coverage. Our theoretical analysis focuses on scenarios with two service providers and compares the system dynamics when they are competing with the dynamics when they are cooperating. We show that sharing can be beneficial to a service provider even when it has the power to drive the other service provider out of the market, a byproduct of a non-convex cost function. A key element of this study is an analysis of the competitive equilibria for both cooperative and non-cooperative 2-person games in the presence of (non-convex) cost functions that involve a fixed cost component.