苹果应用商店的困境愈演愈烈

R. Blair, Tirza J. Angerhofer
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引用次数: 0

摘要

通过让App Store成为iPhone用户购买应用程序的唯一官方渠道,苹果创造了iPhone用户和应用程序开发者可以进行业务交易的唯一市场。苹果通过对iPhone用户和应用程序开发商之间的交易收取15%或30%的佣金,利用了它造成的瓶颈。这一行为引发的一系列苹果诉讼可能会给人留下第一印象,因为苹果的行为似乎没有什么可归类的。苹果既不购买也不销售第三方应用程序,因此它不行使垄断或垄断权力。如果原告正确地提出反垄断挑战,法院将不得不确定苹果的行为——使用其专有技术并威胁应用程序开发商和iPhone用户——是否违反了《谢尔曼法》(Sherman Act)第2条。如果法院认定苹果违反了《谢尔曼法》第2条,那么它还必须决定谁受到了反垄断损害,谁有资格根据《克莱顿法》第4条提起诉讼。我们对这些问题进行经济分析。
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Apple's Mounting App Store Woes
By making the App Store the only official channel for iPhone owners to buy apps, Apple has created the only market in which iPhone owners and app developers may transact their business. Apple exploits the bottleneck that it creates by imposing a 15 percent or 30 percent commission on transactions between iPhone owners and app developers. The array of Apple litigation elicited by this conduct may pose a case of first impression, since there does not appear to be a pigeonhole for Apple’s conduct. Apple neither buys nor sells third-party apps and therefore it does not exercise monopsony or monopoly power.

If plaintiffs frame their antitrust challenges correctly, a court will have to determine whether Apple’s conduct—use of its proprietary technology and threats aimed at both app developers and iPhone owners—offends Section 2 of the Sherman Act. If the court finds that Apple has violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act, then it must also decide who has suffered antitrust injury and who has standing to sue under Section 4 of the Clayton Act. We offer an economic analysis of these issues.
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