激励与创新:来自CEO薪酬合同的证据

ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Personnel Management (Topic) Pub Date : 2011-02-16 DOI:10.2139/ssrn.1762621

Bill Francis, I. Hasan, Zenu Sharma

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引用次数: 66

摘要

本文研究了首席执行官薪酬与创新之间的关系。通过对标准普尔400、500和600家公司薪酬合同的实证研究，我们发现期权形式的长期激励与专利和专利引用呈正相关。此外，期权的凹凸性对创新也有正向影响。我们还发现，绩效敏感性薪酬(PPS)与专利和专利引用之间没有关系，但我们确实发现了这些与黄金降落伞之间的正相关关系。最后，我们证明了项目失败后管理者补偿合同的重置是有利的。我们为提供长期承诺和防止失败的补偿合同更适合创新的理论提供了支持

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Incentives and Innovation: Evidence from CEO Compensation Contracts

We investigate the relationship between chief executive officer (CEO) compensation and innovation. In an empirical examination of compensation contracts of S&P 400, 500, and 600 firms we find that long-term incentives in the form of options are positively related to patents and citations to patents. In addition, convexity of options has a positive effect on innovation. We also find no relationship between pay for performance sensitivity (PPS) with patents and citations to patents while we did discover a positive relationship between these and golden parachutes. Finally, we show that subsequent to project failure managers compensation contracts are reset favourably. We provide support for the theory that compensation contracts that offer long-term commitment and protection from failure are more suitable for innovation

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ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Personnel Management (Topic)

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