单一解决方案:重组意大利债务

R. Harrington, Hailey Klabo, Natalie Pita
{"title":"单一解决方案:重组意大利债务","authors":"R. Harrington, Hailey Klabo, Natalie Pita","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3371976","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Italy faces an increasingly unsustainable debt load, now totalling more than €2.4 trillion and representing more than 130% of Italian GDP. The country’s economic indicators do not suggest it will grow its way out of the predicament, and thus immediate and substantial debt relief has become necessary. Other proposals predicated on extending maturities will not help Italy nor its bondholders because they are based on the false presumption that Italy’s economy is about to jump-start. Proposals based on this assumption will be unsuccessful because giving Italy more time will only end with Italy accumulating more debt. \n \nThis proposal outlines a plan to restructure about a quarter of Italy’s total debt stock, for an amount of roughly €500 billion. To accomplish this, we suggest that Italy, pursuant to its power under the Public Debt Consolidated Act, unilaterally retrofit an aggregated, single-limb collective action clause (“CAC”) to government bonds that were issued prior to 2013, under Italian law, and with a maturity date greater than one year. European Central Bank (“ECB”)-held bonds also would be exempted. \n \nRestructuring the debt incrementally in this fashion would achieve the following: 1) immediate and substantial debt relief, as even 25% of Italy’s debt would more than easily double the size of the Greek restructuring, while providing a legally sound and streamlined model Italy could employ should further restructuring be required; 2) the power to functionally eliminate blocking positions for potential holdouts, while still giving affected bondholders the power to “fight” a restructuring by negotiating prior to the vote; and 3) reduced legal risk by using an internationally recognized International Capital Market Association (“ICMA”)-style single limb CAC to restructure the pre-2013 bonds, while also avoiding the legal uncertainty attendant with any restructuring of the post-2013 bonds containing EuroCACs.","PeriodicalId":376458,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Debt (Topic)","volume":"42 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-04-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Single-Limb Solution: Restructuring Italian Debt\",\"authors\":\"R. Harrington, Hailey Klabo, Natalie Pita\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/SSRN.3371976\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Italy faces an increasingly unsustainable debt load, now totalling more than €2.4 trillion and representing more than 130% of Italian GDP. The country’s economic indicators do not suggest it will grow its way out of the predicament, and thus immediate and substantial debt relief has become necessary. Other proposals predicated on extending maturities will not help Italy nor its bondholders because they are based on the false presumption that Italy’s economy is about to jump-start. Proposals based on this assumption will be unsuccessful because giving Italy more time will only end with Italy accumulating more debt. \\n \\nThis proposal outlines a plan to restructure about a quarter of Italy’s total debt stock, for an amount of roughly €500 billion. To accomplish this, we suggest that Italy, pursuant to its power under the Public Debt Consolidated Act, unilaterally retrofit an aggregated, single-limb collective action clause (“CAC”) to government bonds that were issued prior to 2013, under Italian law, and with a maturity date greater than one year. European Central Bank (“ECB”)-held bonds also would be exempted. \\n \\nRestructuring the debt incrementally in this fashion would achieve the following: 1) immediate and substantial debt relief, as even 25% of Italy’s debt would more than easily double the size of the Greek restructuring, while providing a legally sound and streamlined model Italy could employ should further restructuring be required; 2) the power to functionally eliminate blocking positions for potential holdouts, while still giving affected bondholders the power to “fight” a restructuring by negotiating prior to the vote; and 3) reduced legal risk by using an internationally recognized International Capital Market Association (“ICMA”)-style single limb CAC to restructure the pre-2013 bonds, while also avoiding the legal uncertainty attendant with any restructuring of the post-2013 bonds containing EuroCACs.\",\"PeriodicalId\":376458,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"PSN: Debt (Topic)\",\"volume\":\"42 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2019-04-14\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"PSN: Debt (Topic)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3371976\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"PSN: Debt (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3371976","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

意大利面临着越来越不可持续的债务负担,目前债务总额超过2.4万亿欧元,占意大利GDP的130%以上。该国的经济指标并不表明它将通过增长摆脱困境,因此,立即大幅减免债务已成为必要。其他以延长债务期限为前提的提议对意大利及其债券持有人都没有帮助,因为它们是基于意大利经济即将启动的错误假设。基于这一假设的提议不会成功,因为给意大利更多时间只会导致意大利积累更多债务。该提案概述了一项重组意大利总债务存量约四分之一的计划,金额约为5000亿欧元。为实现这一目标,我们建议意大利根据《公共债务合并法》赋予的权力,对2013年之前根据意大利法律发行的、到期日超过一年的政府债券,单方面修改汇总、单一条款集体行动条款(“CAC”)。欧洲中央银行(ECB)持有的债券也将被豁免。以这种方式逐步重组债务将实现以下目标:1)立即大幅减免债务,因为即使意大利债务的25%也很容易使希腊的债务重组规模翻一番,同时为意大利提供一个法律上合理且精简的模式,如果需要进一步重组,意大利可以采用;2)有权从功能上消除潜在债权人的阻碍地位,同时仍赋予受影响的债券持有人在投票前通过谈判“对抗”重组的权力;3)通过使用国际公认的国际资本市场协会(“ICMA”)式的单分支CAC来重组2013年前的债券,降低了法律风险,同时也避免了2013年后包含欧洲CAC的债券重组所带来的法律不确定性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
Single-Limb Solution: Restructuring Italian Debt
Italy faces an increasingly unsustainable debt load, now totalling more than €2.4 trillion and representing more than 130% of Italian GDP. The country’s economic indicators do not suggest it will grow its way out of the predicament, and thus immediate and substantial debt relief has become necessary. Other proposals predicated on extending maturities will not help Italy nor its bondholders because they are based on the false presumption that Italy’s economy is about to jump-start. Proposals based on this assumption will be unsuccessful because giving Italy more time will only end with Italy accumulating more debt. This proposal outlines a plan to restructure about a quarter of Italy’s total debt stock, for an amount of roughly €500 billion. To accomplish this, we suggest that Italy, pursuant to its power under the Public Debt Consolidated Act, unilaterally retrofit an aggregated, single-limb collective action clause (“CAC”) to government bonds that were issued prior to 2013, under Italian law, and with a maturity date greater than one year. European Central Bank (“ECB”)-held bonds also would be exempted. Restructuring the debt incrementally in this fashion would achieve the following: 1) immediate and substantial debt relief, as even 25% of Italy’s debt would more than easily double the size of the Greek restructuring, while providing a legally sound and streamlined model Italy could employ should further restructuring be required; 2) the power to functionally eliminate blocking positions for potential holdouts, while still giving affected bondholders the power to “fight” a restructuring by negotiating prior to the vote; and 3) reduced legal risk by using an internationally recognized International Capital Market Association (“ICMA”)-style single limb CAC to restructure the pre-2013 bonds, while also avoiding the legal uncertainty attendant with any restructuring of the post-2013 bonds containing EuroCACs.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
期刊最新文献
What Drives Variation in the U.S. Debt/Output Ratio? The Dogs that Didn't Bark Value Recovery Instruments: A Contrarian Proposition 재원조달 방법을 고려한 재정지출 효과 분석 : 미국의 사례를 중심으로 (Estimating Fiscal Multiplier: Do Financing Methods Matter?) Sovereign debt dynamics with serial defaults Policy Brief: Design Choices in Sovereign Asset Management Companies
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1