{"title":"加密芯片的辐射侧信道攻击","authors":"Ming Qu, Yuchun Chang","doi":"10.1109/ICAM.2016.7813560","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Irradiation Side-Channel Attack (ISCA) is an innovation for cracking cryptosystem and circuit structure without physical damage. Based on the ISCA architecture design, we proposed an irradiation centric side-channel attack model to induce the cryptographic chip to generate soft error, and we build an irradiation soft error model to present the circuit's behavior. We design a formal verification via the model checking method to analyze and evaluate whether the result or the effect of the circuit's side-channel leakage is consistent with the predefined soft error model. On the basis of the soft error model, we build a model checking process model and an ISCA prototype to implement side-channel attack to get internal key information about chips' integrated circuits. This is illustrated using an ISCA simulation scenario on cryptographic chips' SRAM and Flash. Experimental results show that the proposed method is feasible and effective.","PeriodicalId":179100,"journal":{"name":"2016 International Conference on Integrated Circuits and Microsystems (ICICM)","volume":"70 33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2016-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Irradiation side-channel attack on cryptographic chip\",\"authors\":\"Ming Qu, Yuchun Chang\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/ICAM.2016.7813560\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Irradiation Side-Channel Attack (ISCA) is an innovation for cracking cryptosystem and circuit structure without physical damage. Based on the ISCA architecture design, we proposed an irradiation centric side-channel attack model to induce the cryptographic chip to generate soft error, and we build an irradiation soft error model to present the circuit's behavior. We design a formal verification via the model checking method to analyze and evaluate whether the result or the effect of the circuit's side-channel leakage is consistent with the predefined soft error model. On the basis of the soft error model, we build a model checking process model and an ISCA prototype to implement side-channel attack to get internal key information about chips' integrated circuits. This is illustrated using an ISCA simulation scenario on cryptographic chips' SRAM and Flash. Experimental results show that the proposed method is feasible and effective.\",\"PeriodicalId\":179100,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"2016 International Conference on Integrated Circuits and Microsystems (ICICM)\",\"volume\":\"70 33 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2016-11-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"2\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"2016 International Conference on Integrated Circuits and Microsystems (ICICM)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/ICAM.2016.7813560\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2016 International Conference on Integrated Circuits and Microsystems (ICICM)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/ICAM.2016.7813560","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Irradiation side-channel attack on cryptographic chip
Irradiation Side-Channel Attack (ISCA) is an innovation for cracking cryptosystem and circuit structure without physical damage. Based on the ISCA architecture design, we proposed an irradiation centric side-channel attack model to induce the cryptographic chip to generate soft error, and we build an irradiation soft error model to present the circuit's behavior. We design a formal verification via the model checking method to analyze and evaluate whether the result or the effect of the circuit's side-channel leakage is consistent with the predefined soft error model. On the basis of the soft error model, we build a model checking process model and an ISCA prototype to implement side-channel attack to get internal key information about chips' integrated circuits. This is illustrated using an ISCA simulation scenario on cryptographic chips' SRAM and Flash. Experimental results show that the proposed method is feasible and effective.