{"title":"敌人的敌人就是朋友:稳定网络的新状况","authors":"Hideto Koizumi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3508607","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines if an ancient principle, ``the enemy of my enemy is my friend,'' is a good predictor of group formation. I model coalition formation as a static network formation game with complementarities between a pair of adjacent nodes. I demonstrate that the ancient proverb is indeed a sufficient condition for the existence of a stable network that is also efficient.","PeriodicalId":274998,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Other International Relations Theory & Conflict (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-12-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Enemy of My Enemy Is My Friend: A New Condition for Stable Networks\",\"authors\":\"Hideto Koizumi\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.3508607\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This paper examines if an ancient principle, ``the enemy of my enemy is my friend,'' is a good predictor of group formation. I model coalition formation as a static network formation game with complementarities between a pair of adjacent nodes. I demonstrate that the ancient proverb is indeed a sufficient condition for the existence of a stable network that is also efficient.\",\"PeriodicalId\":274998,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"PSN: Other International Relations Theory & Conflict (Topic)\",\"volume\":\"1 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2019-12-23\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"PSN: Other International Relations Theory & Conflict (Topic)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3508607\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"PSN: Other International Relations Theory & Conflict (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3508607","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
The Enemy of My Enemy Is My Friend: A New Condition for Stable Networks
This paper examines if an ancient principle, ``the enemy of my enemy is my friend,'' is a good predictor of group formation. I model coalition formation as a static network formation game with complementarities between a pair of adjacent nodes. I demonstrate that the ancient proverb is indeed a sufficient condition for the existence of a stable network that is also efficient.
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
分享
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：
扫码关注我们
