竞争对手监控和收入绩效:来自酒店业的证据

J. Hesford, M. Turner, Nicolas Mangin, Charles R. Thomas, Kelly Hoffmann
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引用次数: 2

摘要

本研究考察了企业如何使用以竞争对手为中心的会计信息,特别是竞争对手监控信息,影响其定价、需求和整体收入绩效。考察的监测活动是监测的范围、监测自己酒店等级以上和以下(即细分市场)、监测的互惠程度。竞争对手分析是战略管理会计(SMA)的核心要素,但由于公司不披露竞争对手监测活动,因此很少进行实证研究。证明竞争监控的价值为SMA提供了强有力的支持。我们从美国最大的酒店市场之一获得了有关定价、需求和收入的存档、专有监控信息。通过回归,我们对绩效指标(定价、需求和收入)和监控行为之间的关系进行了建模,同时控制了质量(酒店特征和管理技能)、竞争强度、酒店类别、地理位置和所有权类型。我们的研究结果表明,竞争对手监测的两个方面影响酒店定价,进而影响酒店需求和收入绩效。具体来说,监控更多竞争对手(我们称之为范围)的酒店在需求不变的情况下获得更高的价格,从而获得更高的收入表现。大多数酒店都在自己的班级里进行监控。然而,偏离自己的阶层会产生深远的影响:选择质量较低(较高)的酒店会导致酒店设定较低(较高)的价格,从而导致更高(不变)的需求和更低(较高)的收入表现。令人惊讶的是,我们没有发现对监测互惠性的支持。也就是说,酒店所监控的竞争对手是否依次遵循目标,对酒店的收益绩效结果没有影响。虽然SMA文献指出了竞争对手监控的重要性,但本研究通过记录竞争对手监控行为与组织收入绩效之间的联系,填补了一个重要的、研究不足的领域的空白。这可能有助于促进SMA实践的更大传播。
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Competitor Monitoring and Revenue Performance: Evidence from the Hospitality Industry
This study examines how firms’ use of competitor-focused accounting information, specifically competitor monitoring information, impacts their pricing, demand, and overall revenue performance. The monitoring activities examined are the scope of monitoring, monitoring above and below one’s own hotel class (i.e., market segment), and the extent of reciprocity of monitoring. Competitor analysis is a central element in strategic management accounting (SMA), yet little empirical research has been done since companies do not disclose competitor monitoring activities. Proving the value of competitive monitoring provides strong support for SMA. Archival, proprietary monitoring information regarding pricing, demand, and revenue were obtained from one of the largest hotel markets in the United States. Using regression, we modeled the relationships between performance measures (pricing, demand, and revenue) and monitoring behaviors, while controlling for quality (hotel characteristics and management skill), competitive intensity, hotel class, geographic location, and ownership type. Our results indicate that two aspects of competitor monitoring impact hotel pricing that, in turn, impacts hotel demand and revenue performance. Specifically, a hotel monitoring more competitors (what we refer to as Scope) achieves higher prices with unchanged demand, resulting in higher revenue performance. Most hotels monitor within their class. However, deviating from one’s class has profound outcomes: looking at lower (higher) quality hotels results in a hotel setting lower (higher) prices, resulting in higher (unchanged) demand and lower (higher) revenue performance. Surprisingly, we did not find support for the reciprocity of monitoring. That is, whether the competitors monitored by a hotel, in turn follow the target, has no impact on hotel revenue performance outcomes. While the SMA literature notes the importance of competitor monitoring, this study fills a gap in an important, under-researched area by documenting the link between competitor monitoring behaviors and organizational revenue performance. This may help promote greater diffusion of SMA practices.
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