{"title":"借款人私人信息契约和贷款合同监督","authors":"Richard Carrizosa, Stephen G. Ryan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2585245","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We identify covenants in commercial loan contracts that require public borrowers to periodically disclose two types of accounting-related private information to lenders: projected financial statements for future periods and monthly historical financial statements. We hypothesize and provide evidence that: (1) loan contracts include these covenants in settings where they enhance lenders’ loan contract monitoring; (2) the covenants are positively associated with the frequency of loan contract amendments; and (3) lenders trade on the borrower private information they receive in secondary loan markets. We further show that the two types of covenants have predictably different determinants and effects.","PeriodicalId":285784,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Economics of Contract: Theory (Topic)","volume":"339 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2016-03-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"73","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Borrower Private Information Covenants and Loan Contract Monitoring\",\"authors\":\"Richard Carrizosa, Stephen G. Ryan\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.2585245\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We identify covenants in commercial loan contracts that require public borrowers to periodically disclose two types of accounting-related private information to lenders: projected financial statements for future periods and monthly historical financial statements. We hypothesize and provide evidence that: (1) loan contracts include these covenants in settings where they enhance lenders’ loan contract monitoring; (2) the covenants are positively associated with the frequency of loan contract amendments; and (3) lenders trade on the borrower private information they receive in secondary loan markets. We further show that the two types of covenants have predictably different determinants and effects.\",\"PeriodicalId\":285784,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"ERN: Economics of Contract: Theory (Topic)\",\"volume\":\"339 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2016-03-02\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"73\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"ERN: Economics of Contract: Theory (Topic)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2585245\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ERN: Economics of Contract: Theory (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2585245","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Borrower Private Information Covenants and Loan Contract Monitoring
We identify covenants in commercial loan contracts that require public borrowers to periodically disclose two types of accounting-related private information to lenders: projected financial statements for future periods and monthly historical financial statements. We hypothesize and provide evidence that: (1) loan contracts include these covenants in settings where they enhance lenders’ loan contract monitoring; (2) the covenants are positively associated with the frequency of loan contract amendments; and (3) lenders trade on the borrower private information they receive in secondary loan markets. We further show that the two types of covenants have predictably different determinants and effects.