借款人私人信息契约和贷款合同监督

Richard Carrizosa, Stephen G. Ryan
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引用次数: 73

摘要

我们发现商业贷款合同中的契约要求公共借款人定期向贷款人披露两种与会计相关的私人信息:未来期间的预计财务报表和月度历史财务报表。我们假设并提供证据表明:(1)贷款合同在加强贷款人贷款合同监督的环境中包含这些契约;(2)契约与贷款合同修改频率呈正相关;(3)贷款人利用他们在二级贷款市场上获得的借款人的私人信息进行交易。我们进一步表明,这两种契约具有可预见的不同决定因素和影响。
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Borrower Private Information Covenants and Loan Contract Monitoring
We identify covenants in commercial loan contracts that require public borrowers to periodically disclose two types of accounting-related private information to lenders: projected financial statements for future periods and monthly historical financial statements. We hypothesize and provide evidence that: (1) loan contracts include these covenants in settings where they enhance lenders’ loan contract monitoring; (2) the covenants are positively associated with the frequency of loan contract amendments; and (3) lenders trade on the borrower private information they receive in secondary loan markets. We further show that the two types of covenants have predictably different determinants and effects.
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