薪酬与激励:实践vs.理论

G. Baker, M. C. Jensen, Kevin J. Murphy
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引用次数: 1770

摘要

对内部激励结构的透彻理解对于建立一个可行的企业理论至关重要,因为这些激励在很大程度上决定了组织内部个人的行为方式。传统的经济理论很难解释组织激励系统的许多共同特征——包括薪酬在很大程度上与绩效无关的平等主义薪酬系统,以晋升为基础的激励系统的大量使用,没有工作预付费和有效的担保合同,以及雇主普遍不愿解雇、惩罚或对员工进行糟糕的绩效评估。行为主义者和实践者对这些实践的典型解释显然是不经济的——关注于公平、公平、士气、信任、社会责任和文化等概念。经济学家面临的挑战是为这些做法提供可行的经济学解释,或者将这些替代概念整合到传统的经济模型中。
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Compensation and Incentives: Practice vs. Theory
A thorough understanding of internal incentive structures is critical to developing a viable theory of the firm, since these incentives determine to a large extent how individuals inside an organization behave. Many common features of organizational incentive systems are not easily explained by traditional economic theory--including egalitarian pay systems in which compensation is largely independent of performance, the overwhelming use of promotion-based incentive systems, the absence of up-front fees for jobs and effective bonding contracts, and the general reluctance of employers to fire, penalize, or give poor performance evaluations to employees. Typical explanations for these practices offered by behaviorists and practitioners are distinctly uneconomic--focusing on notions such as fairness, equity, morale, trust, social responsibility, and culture. The challenge to economists is to provide viable economic explanations for these practices or to integrate these alternative notions into the traditional economic model.
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