Post-War Interventionism and Diplomatic Practice in Bosnia Herzegovina: Too Much or Too Little?

After almost 30 years from the Dayton Agreement of 1995, time has come to appraise the successes and failures of interventionism in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). By drawing on insights from a practitioner’s perspective, the article explores the dynamic of diplomatic action and offers a template to assess its (in)effectiveness. With time, rifts have emerged in the international community both in messaging and operational terms, which have reduced, rather than increased, the positive effects of concerted action. Moreover, whilst the Office of the High Representative (ohr) has been an important tool for reconstruction and peace-making, its role remains incompatible with the prospect of full European Union (EU) membership, thus becoming a divisive actor. At the same time the US and UK have come to see the ohr and other non-EU organisations, such as nato and the osce, as the main tools for a continued presence in the country, making overall cooperation more complicated. A “grand plan” is therefore needed to reunite the forces of the players of good will. This will require an arrangement for the winding up of the ohr, coupled with constitutional reform. To this end a new vision for BiH is necessary, both at the international and local level, to better spell out what a “European BiH” should really look like.