{"title":"对“不涉及第三方可信服务器的隐私保护在线叫车系统”的攻击","authors":"S. Vivek","doi":"10.1145/3600160.3605040","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Recently, Xie, Guo, and Jia (IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, vol. 16, pp. 3068-3081, 2021) proposed a privacy-preserving Online Ride-Hailing (ORH) protocol that does not make use of a trusted third-party server. The primary goal of such privacy-preserving ORH protocols is to ensure the privacy of riders’ and drivers’ location data w.r.t. the ORH Service Provider (SP). In this work, we demonstrate a passive attack by the SP in the protocol of Xie, Guo, and Jia that enables it to completely recover the location of the rider as well as that of the responding drivers in each and every ride request query. The running time of our attack is independent of the security parameter.","PeriodicalId":107145,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2023-08-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Attack on “A Privacy-Preserving Online Ride-Hailing System Without Involving a Third Trusted Server”\",\"authors\":\"S. Vivek\",\"doi\":\"10.1145/3600160.3605040\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Recently, Xie, Guo, and Jia (IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, vol. 16, pp. 3068-3081, 2021) proposed a privacy-preserving Online Ride-Hailing (ORH) protocol that does not make use of a trusted third-party server. The primary goal of such privacy-preserving ORH protocols is to ensure the privacy of riders’ and drivers’ location data w.r.t. the ORH Service Provider (SP). In this work, we demonstrate a passive attack by the SP in the protocol of Xie, Guo, and Jia that enables it to completely recover the location of the rider as well as that of the responding drivers in each and every ride request query. The running time of our attack is independent of the security parameter.\",\"PeriodicalId\":107145,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-08-29\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1145/3600160.3605040\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3600160.3605040","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
摘要
最近,Xie, Guo和Jia (IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, vol. 16, pp. 3068- 3081,2021)提出了一种不使用可信第三方服务器的保护隐私的在线叫车(ORH)协议。这种隐私保护的ORH协议的主要目标是确保乘客和司机的位置数据的隐私,而不是ORH服务提供商(SP)。在这项工作中,我们展示了Xie, Guo和Jia协议中的SP的被动攻击,使其能够完全恢复每个乘车请求查询中乘客以及响应司机的位置。攻击的运行时间与安全参数无关。
Attack on “A Privacy-Preserving Online Ride-Hailing System Without Involving a Third Trusted Server”
Recently, Xie, Guo, and Jia (IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, vol. 16, pp. 3068-3081, 2021) proposed a privacy-preserving Online Ride-Hailing (ORH) protocol that does not make use of a trusted third-party server. The primary goal of such privacy-preserving ORH protocols is to ensure the privacy of riders’ and drivers’ location data w.r.t. the ORH Service Provider (SP). In this work, we demonstrate a passive attack by the SP in the protocol of Xie, Guo, and Jia that enables it to completely recover the location of the rider as well as that of the responding drivers in each and every ride request query. The running time of our attack is independent of the security parameter.