{"title":"浪费的格罗斯曼-哈特契约理论:期望效用的不利后果","authors":"Hak Choi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2834890","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper shows how expected utility shortcut can result in some adversary conclusion: excessive cost. It then demonstrates graphically how Grossman and Hart (GH) have twisted the agent’s model to form the principal model. A complete principal-agent model is then introduced, and is proved to be a bargaining model. Although there is generally no clear-up solution to the bargaining problem, GH’s method is arbitrary and their result detrimental.","PeriodicalId":285784,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Economics of Contract: Theory (Topic)","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2016-09-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Wasteful Grossman-Hart Contract Theory: An Adverse Consequence of Expected Utility\",\"authors\":\"Hak Choi\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.2834890\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This paper shows how expected utility shortcut can result in some adversary conclusion: excessive cost. It then demonstrates graphically how Grossman and Hart (GH) have twisted the agent’s model to form the principal model. A complete principal-agent model is then introduced, and is proved to be a bargaining model. Although there is generally no clear-up solution to the bargaining problem, GH’s method is arbitrary and their result detrimental.\",\"PeriodicalId\":285784,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"ERN: Economics of Contract: Theory (Topic)\",\"volume\":\"44 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2016-09-05\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"ERN: Economics of Contract: Theory (Topic)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2834890\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ERN: Economics of Contract: Theory (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2834890","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
The Wasteful Grossman-Hart Contract Theory: An Adverse Consequence of Expected Utility
This paper shows how expected utility shortcut can result in some adversary conclusion: excessive cost. It then demonstrates graphically how Grossman and Hart (GH) have twisted the agent’s model to form the principal model. A complete principal-agent model is then introduced, and is proved to be a bargaining model. Although there is generally no clear-up solution to the bargaining problem, GH’s method is arbitrary and their result detrimental.