基于深度学习的AES远场电磁侧信道攻击

Ruize Wang, Huanyu Wang, E. Dubrova
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引用次数: 26

摘要

我们提出了第一个基于深度学习的AES-128侧信道攻击,使用远场电磁发射作为侧信道。我们的神经网络根据从五个不同的蓝牙设备在五个不同的距离上捕获的轨迹进行训练,并在另外四个蓝牙设备上进行测试。即使每个加密只测量一次,我们也可以从距离目标15米的办公环境中捕获的少于10K的跟踪中恢复密钥。以前的模板攻击需要多次重复相同的加密。在1K次重复的情况下,在距离目标15米的距离上,我们平均需要少于400个迹线。这改进了在CHES'2020上提出的模板攻击,模板攻击需要5K跟踪和多达223个密钥枚举。
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Far Field EM Side-Channel Attack on AES Using Deep Learning
We present the first deep learning-based side-channel attack on AES-128 using far field electromagnetic emissions as a side channel. Our neural networks are trained on traces captured from five different Bluetooth devices at five different distances to target and tested on four other Bluetooth devices. We can recover the key from less than 10K traces captured in an office environment at 15 m distance to target even if the measurement for each encryption is taken only once. Previous template attacks required multiple repetitions of the same encryption. For the case of 1K repetitions, we need less than 400 traces on average at 15 m distance to target. This improves the template attack presented at CHES'2020 which requires 5K traces and key enumeration up to 223.
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