模仿游戏:人工智能和未来均衡的哲学

Todd J. Barry
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引用次数: 0

摘要

这篇简短的概念性文章首先论述了人工智能(AI)的“思考”能力。这种增长与人类和人工智能对自然的控制力有关,也与人工智能在人性方面日益增强的力量有关,这可以通过与人类和其他人工智能机器在图灵测试(Turing Test)中竞争的结果以及经济“博弈论”来衡量。这两种挑战,尤其是后一种挑战,都可以通过衡量一个人在不同条件下如何评价自我而不是社会来体现。鉴于AI的进步使其能够在最人性化的游戏中“获胜”,甚至达到普遍有益的“社会最优”结果,因此甚至可能比人类拥有更多的力量,文章主张AI和人类之间在创新中平衡力量的平衡。因此,从广义上讲,随着人工智能和人类在未来的进一步发展,管理者可以作为政府决策者和创新者之间的关键中间人。
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The games of imitation: AI and a philosophy towards future equilibrium
This brief conceptual article starts with an argument for Artificial Intelligence (AI)’s ability to “think.”  This outgrowth relates to human’s and AI’s power over nature, and to AI’s increasing power in its humanness, measured by the results of competing with humans and other AI machines in the Turing Test, and economic “game theory.”  Both, and especially the latter challenge, can be quintessentially human by measuring how one values the self as opposed to society, under varying conditions.  Given AI’s advancements enabling it to presumably “win” in the most humanness of games, beyond even reaching a universally beneficial “social optimal” outcome, and thus possibly even having more power than humankind, the article argues for an equilibrium of balanced powers in innovation between AI and humans.  Therefore, managers, broadly construed, can function as key brokers between government policy makers and innovators as AI and humans continue to develop further into the future.
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