银行压力测试披露、私人信息生产和价格信息性

A. Heitz, Barrett Wheeler
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引用次数: 1

摘要

根据《多德-弗兰克法案》(Dodd-Frank Act),从2015年至2017年,持有100亿至500亿美元资产的银行必须披露部分公司压力测试结果。我们发现,在更有经验的分析师的推动下,这些披露与分析师追随率下降5.9%有关。继续关注这些银行的分析师发布的预测不那么分散,包含的具体公司信息也较少。此外,信息披露后,银行股票收益与整个股票市场更加同步,表明收益包含的公司特定信息更少。虽然披露压力测试结果的目的是加强市场监督,但我们的结果并不支持增加市场监督。相反,它们与最近的理论模型是一致的,这些模型表明,加强监管披露可能会产生意想不到的后果。
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Bank Stress Test Disclosures, Private Information Production, and Price Informativeness
Pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act, from 2015-2017, banks holding assets between $10 - $50 billion were required to disclose a portion of their company-run stress test results. We find that these disclosures are associated with a 5.9% reduction in analyst following, driven by more experienced analysts. Analysts that continue to follow these banks issue forecasts that are less dispersed and contain less firm-specific information. Furthermore, post-disclosure, bank equity returns become more synchronous with the entire stock market, indicating that returns contain less firm-specific information. While disclosure of stress test results was intended to enhance market monitoring, our results do not support an increase in market monitoring. Instead, they are consistent with recent theory models suggesting that increased regulatory disclosures may have unintended consequences.
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