旗舰进入在线市场

G. Jin, Zhentong Lu, Xiaolu Zhou, Lu Fang
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在全渠道零售的世界里,一些品牌在网上市场开设旗舰店,而另一些品牌则避免这样做。本文以某大型电子商务平台为研究对象,实证研究了旗舰店入驻对消费者、平台以及平台上各类卖家的影响。我们发现旗舰进入可能通过扩大选择集,通过加强入门品牌内部的价格竞争,以及通过提高消费者对部分平台的感知,使消费者受益。与此同时,旗舰产品会蚕食同品牌卖家的销售,而随着买家群体在平台上的扩大,其他品牌可能会获益。反事实模拟表明,旗舰品牌进入会提高平台的商品总价值(GMV),但会损害进入品牌的现有卖家。平均而言,如果旗舰产品来自非知名品牌,对消费者福利的影响比来自知名品牌的影响更积极,因为消费者倾向于在知名旗舰产品进入时降低他们为个人卖家支付的意愿。在假设旗舰店进入伴随着对其他同品牌销售商的限制的情况下,竞争的减少对旗舰店有利,但对消费者不利。
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Flagship Entry in Online Marketplaces
In the world of omnichannel retail, some brands open a flagship store at online marketplaces, while others avert it. Focusing on a large e-commerce platform, we empirically study how flagship entry affects consumers, the platform, and various sellers on the platform. We find flagship entry may benefit consumers by expanding the choice set, by intensifying price competition within the entry brand, and by improving consumer perception for parts of the platform. In the meantime, flagship entry cannibalizes the sales of same-brand sellers, while other brands may gain as the buyer base expands on the platform. Counterfactual simulation suggests that flagship entry improves the gross merchandise value (GMV) of the platform but hurts existing sellers of the entry brand. On average, the effect on consumer welfare is more positive if the flagship entry is from a non-prominent brand than from a prominent brand, because consumers tend to lower their willingness to pay for individual sellers upon a prominent flagship entry. In hypothetical scenarios where flagship entry were accompanied by constraints on other same-brand sellers, the reduced competition would benefit the flagship store but hurt consumers.
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