{"title":"道德分歧与人工智能","authors":"P. Robinson","doi":"10.1145/3461702.3462534","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Artificially intelligent systems will be used to make increasingly important decisions about us. Many of these decisions will have to be made without consensus about the relevant moral facts. I argue that what makes moral disagreement especially challenging is that there are two different ways of handling it: political solutions, which aim to find a fair compromise, and epistemic solutions, which aim at moral truth.","PeriodicalId":197336,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2021 AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society","volume":"368 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-07-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Moral Disagreement and Artificial Intelligence\",\"authors\":\"P. Robinson\",\"doi\":\"10.1145/3461702.3462534\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Artificially intelligent systems will be used to make increasingly important decisions about us. Many of these decisions will have to be made without consensus about the relevant moral facts. I argue that what makes moral disagreement especially challenging is that there are two different ways of handling it: political solutions, which aim to find a fair compromise, and epistemic solutions, which aim at moral truth.\",\"PeriodicalId\":197336,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Proceedings of the 2021 AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society\",\"volume\":\"368 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-07-21\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"2\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Proceedings of the 2021 AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1145/3461702.3462534\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Proceedings of the 2021 AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3461702.3462534","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Artificially intelligent systems will be used to make increasingly important decisions about us. Many of these decisions will have to be made without consensus about the relevant moral facts. I argue that what makes moral disagreement especially challenging is that there are two different ways of handling it: political solutions, which aim to find a fair compromise, and epistemic solutions, which aim at moral truth.
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