{"title":"用单向协议扩展身份验证层次结构","authors":"Johannes Wilson, Mikael Asplund, N. Johansson","doi":"10.1109/CSF57540.2023.00025","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Providing authenticated interactions is a key responsibility of most cryptographic protocols. When designing new protocols with strict security requirements it is therefore essential to formally verify that they fulfil appropriate authentication properties. We identify a gap in the case of protocols with unilateral (one-way) authentication, where existing properties are poorly adapted. In existing work, there is a preference for defining strong authentication properties, which is good in many cases but not universally applicable. In this work we make the case for weaker authentication properties. In particular, we investigate one-way authentication and extend Lowe's authentication hierarchy with two such properties. We formally prove the relationship between the added and existing properties. Moreover, we demonstrate the usefulness of the added properties in a case study on remote attestation protocols. This work complements earlier work with additional generic properties that support formal verification of a wider set of protocol types.","PeriodicalId":179870,"journal":{"name":"2023 IEEE 36th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Extending the Authentication Hierarchy with One-Way Agreement\",\"authors\":\"Johannes Wilson, Mikael Asplund, N. Johansson\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/CSF57540.2023.00025\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Providing authenticated interactions is a key responsibility of most cryptographic protocols. When designing new protocols with strict security requirements it is therefore essential to formally verify that they fulfil appropriate authentication properties. We identify a gap in the case of protocols with unilateral (one-way) authentication, where existing properties are poorly adapted. In existing work, there is a preference for defining strong authentication properties, which is good in many cases but not universally applicable. In this work we make the case for weaker authentication properties. In particular, we investigate one-way authentication and extend Lowe's authentication hierarchy with two such properties. We formally prove the relationship between the added and existing properties. Moreover, we demonstrate the usefulness of the added properties in a case study on remote attestation protocols. This work complements earlier work with additional generic properties that support formal verification of a wider set of protocol types.\",\"PeriodicalId\":179870,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"2023 IEEE 36th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF)\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-07-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"2023 IEEE 36th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSF57540.2023.00025\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2023 IEEE 36th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSF57540.2023.00025","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Extending the Authentication Hierarchy with One-Way Agreement
Providing authenticated interactions is a key responsibility of most cryptographic protocols. When designing new protocols with strict security requirements it is therefore essential to formally verify that they fulfil appropriate authentication properties. We identify a gap in the case of protocols with unilateral (one-way) authentication, where existing properties are poorly adapted. In existing work, there is a preference for defining strong authentication properties, which is good in many cases but not universally applicable. In this work we make the case for weaker authentication properties. In particular, we investigate one-way authentication and extend Lowe's authentication hierarchy with two such properties. We formally prove the relationship between the added and existing properties. Moreover, we demonstrate the usefulness of the added properties in a case study on remote attestation protocols. This work complements earlier work with additional generic properties that support formal verification of a wider set of protocol types.