Finite Approximation of Continuous Noncooperative Two-person Games on a Product of Linear Strategy Functional Spaces

A method of the finite approximation of continuous noncooperative two-person games is presented. The method is based on sampling the functional spaces, which serve as the sets of pure strategies of the players. The pure strategy is a linear function of time, in which the trenddefining coefficient is variable. The spaces of the players’ pure strategies are sampled uniformly so that the resulting finite game is a bimatrix game whose payoff matrices are square. The approximation procedure starts with not a great number of intervals. Then this number is gradually increased, and new, bigger, bimatrix games are solved until an acceptable solution of the bimatrix game becomes sufficiently close to the same-type solutions at the preceding iterations. The closeness is expressed as the absolute difference between the trend-defining coefficients of the strategies from the neighboring solutions. These distances should be decreasing once they are smoothed with respective polynomials of degree 2. AMS Subject Classification: 91A05, 91A10, 65D99, 41A99.