为什么团队项目进展缓慢?基于战略不确定性的模型

Jiro Yoshida
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文分析了团队项目的投资时机。在需求不确定的情况下,保持未来投资选择的灵活性是有价值的。然而,一方的灵活性会给另一方带来战略上的不确定性,从而导致另一方选择更高水平的灵活性。这种战略上的互补性导致投资延迟,而不是为了先发制人而加速投资。这种战略效应也不同于搭便车问题,因为本研究关注的是回报的第二时刻。该模型也为组织决策中的现状偏见提供了一种理性的选择。
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Why Do Team Projects Progress Slowly? A Model Based on Strategic Uncertainty
This paper analyzes the investment timing for team projects. Under demand uncertainty, it is valuable to maintain flexibility in future investment alternatives. However, one party's flexibility creates strategic uncertainty for another party, which causes the other party to choose a higher level of flexibility. This strategic complementarity leads to delays in investments in contrast to the case of accelerated investments for preemption. This strategic effect is also distinct from the free-rider problem because this study focuses on the second moment of payoffs. The model also provides a rational alternative to the status-quo bias in organizational decision-making.
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