在线拍卖应该采用动态买断定价模型吗?

R. Vragov, R. Shang, K. Lang
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引用次数: 5

摘要

在线拍卖本质上是动态的。人们普遍认为,将经济环境的时间变化内化的在线拍卖设计比静态设计表现更好。这是因为为买卖双方提供机会,让他们互相了解偏好随时间的变化,可以增加市场透明度,提高市场效率。在本文中,我们关注的是在线拍卖独有的一个特征,即买断价格。我们引入了一个动态买断模型,并分析了买断价格如何随时间变化以使卖方利润和买方剩余最大化。基于我们的理论结果,我们建议增加更多的动态特征可以提高在线拍卖的性能。最后,我们描述了一个可用于估计动态买断期权收益的实验设计。
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Should Online Auctions Employ Dynamic Buyout Pricing Models?
Online auctions are inherently dynamic. Online auction designs that internalize temporal changes in the economic environment are generally expected to perform better than static designs. This is because providing opportunities for both buyers and sellers to inform each other about preference changes over time can increase market transparency and lead to more efficient markets. In this paper, we focus on a feature that is unique to online auctions, the buyout price. We introduce a dynamic buyout model and show analytically how the buyout price should change over time in order to maximize seller profit and buyer surplus. Based on our theoretical results, we suggest that online auction performance can be improved with the addition of more dynamic features. Finally, we describe an experimental design that can be used to estimate the benefits of a dynamic buyout option.
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