{"title":"司法部对联邦司法宽大的攻击,最高法院的回应,以及刑事判决的未来","authors":"S. Klein, S. Thompson","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1418622","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The last few years have brought some equilibrium to the power struggle in the federal system between prosecutors, judges, and Congress over criminal sentencing. Though pieces of this story have been shared and various Supreme Court sentencing cases analyzed, our unique contribution is to explain how and why a true sentencing reform movement that began in the mid-1980's was co-opted by conservative politics at the federal level at the turn of this century, thereby eliminating one avenue of change entirely for all federal and state actors. Part I belongs to Main Justice. (see Note below) It was during the early days of George W. Bush's administration that the Department of Justice began its all-out assault on the federal judiciary's sentencing powers as part of a campaign to consolidate central authority and to require the harshest possible sentences for all federal convictions. DOJ's campaign was played out in numerous arenas at the same time: (1) in Congress, where DOJ urged the adoption of laws addressing the problem of leniency of district court judges; (2) before the U.S. Sentencing Commission (Commission), which DOJ chided for not doing enough about the leniency problem; and (3) even among its own field offices by attempting to virtually eliminate the traditional charging discretion exercised by prosecutors and instead mandating that all federal prosecutors bring the most serious charges provable. Eventually, as the straw that broke the Court's back, the Department succeeded in prompting Congress to enact the Feeney Amendment, a piece of legislation that was viewed as a frontal assault on the discretion of federal judges in sentencing. Though the show is far from over, the Supreme Court regained the upper hand over both DOJ and Congress, as we explain in Part II, by trumping Congress's legislation (and DOJ's political agenda) on constitutional grounds. In United States v. Booker the Court upheld the overall constitutionality of the federal sentencing system but only on the condition that the Guidelines be applied in a purely advisory manner, subject to extremely weak appellate review for reasonableness. The Supreme Court gave the power over sentencing that Congress had transferred to DOJ back to judges. The Court reaffirmed that position in a series of additional Sixth Amendment cases decided in the October 2007 and 2008 Terms: Gall v. United States, Kimbrough v. United States, (both heard in the October 2007 Term) and Spears v. United States, (heard in the October 2008 Term) firmed federal district judge discretion through rigid limits on appellate reversals. The Court appeared far less concerned with the effects of its opinions on state criminal justice systems. This was sensible, as most states don't have mandatory sentencing guideline systems or presumptive sentencing systems, those states that do build more judicial flexibility in their systems, and state legislators are not at war with their judiciary, the Court's new constitutional rulings in fact had significantly less effect on state than on federal sentencing. This is not to say, as we note in Part III, that the Court entirely ignored the states; two recalcitrant states were pointedly reminded of the Blakely/Booker rule, and the Court in its most recent sentencing decision, Oregon v. Ice, (heard in the October 2008 Term) granted state trial judges even more discretion through the practice of imposing concurrent or consecutive sentences for multiple offenses. As a result of the last few terms, many of the recent victories that the Department enjoyed in the political arena it lost in the courts. Under the administration of Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales, the Department continued its push for more stringent punishments, but changes in circumstances required a new approach. Congress considered and rejected new legislation that might constitutionally replicate DOJ's earlier coup. When DOJs Republican allies in Congress lost their majority position after the 2006 elections, the push for harsher punishments slowed considerably. We expect Attorney General Eric Holder to back away from harsh sentencing laws and tight control over Assistant United States Attorneys (AUSA) in the field. We now see federal district judges sentence below the range provided in the federal sentencing guidelines with building frequently, yet not ignore the guidelines. Though states judges never suffered in the same manner, we expect state legislators to react to the new constitutional requirement by increasing state judicial discretion in sentencing through advisory rather than mandatory guidelines, and expanding judicial authority to stack sentences. Note: This is the not always respectful designation of the Attorney General, other political appointees, and trial attorneys working on Pennsylvania Ave. and other downtown D.C. locations, as distinguished from the 94 U.S. Attorney's Offices located throughout the United States.","PeriodicalId":170753,"journal":{"name":"Tulsa Law Review","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2009-06-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"DOJ's Attack on Federal Judicial Leniency, the Supreme Court's Response, and the Future of Criminal Sentencing\",\"authors\":\"S. Klein, S. Thompson\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/SSRN.1418622\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The last few years have brought some equilibrium to the power struggle in the federal system between prosecutors, judges, and Congress over criminal sentencing. Though pieces of this story have been shared and various Supreme Court sentencing cases analyzed, our unique contribution is to explain how and why a true sentencing reform movement that began in the mid-1980's was co-opted by conservative politics at the federal level at the turn of this century, thereby eliminating one avenue of change entirely for all federal and state actors. Part I belongs to Main Justice. (see Note below) It was during the early days of George W. Bush's administration that the Department of Justice began its all-out assault on the federal judiciary's sentencing powers as part of a campaign to consolidate central authority and to require the harshest possible sentences for all federal convictions. DOJ's campaign was played out in numerous arenas at the same time: (1) in Congress, where DOJ urged the adoption of laws addressing the problem of leniency of district court judges; (2) before the U.S. Sentencing Commission (Commission), which DOJ chided for not doing enough about the leniency problem; and (3) even among its own field offices by attempting to virtually eliminate the traditional charging discretion exercised by prosecutors and instead mandating that all federal prosecutors bring the most serious charges provable. Eventually, as the straw that broke the Court's back, the Department succeeded in prompting Congress to enact the Feeney Amendment, a piece of legislation that was viewed as a frontal assault on the discretion of federal judges in sentencing. Though the show is far from over, the Supreme Court regained the upper hand over both DOJ and Congress, as we explain in Part II, by trumping Congress's legislation (and DOJ's political agenda) on constitutional grounds. In United States v. Booker the Court upheld the overall constitutionality of the federal sentencing system but only on the condition that the Guidelines be applied in a purely advisory manner, subject to extremely weak appellate review for reasonableness. The Supreme Court gave the power over sentencing that Congress had transferred to DOJ back to judges. The Court reaffirmed that position in a series of additional Sixth Amendment cases decided in the October 2007 and 2008 Terms: Gall v. United States, Kimbrough v. United States, (both heard in the October 2007 Term) and Spears v. United States, (heard in the October 2008 Term) firmed federal district judge discretion through rigid limits on appellate reversals. The Court appeared far less concerned with the effects of its opinions on state criminal justice systems. This was sensible, as most states don't have mandatory sentencing guideline systems or presumptive sentencing systems, those states that do build more judicial flexibility in their systems, and state legislators are not at war with their judiciary, the Court's new constitutional rulings in fact had significantly less effect on state than on federal sentencing. This is not to say, as we note in Part III, that the Court entirely ignored the states; two recalcitrant states were pointedly reminded of the Blakely/Booker rule, and the Court in its most recent sentencing decision, Oregon v. Ice, (heard in the October 2008 Term) granted state trial judges even more discretion through the practice of imposing concurrent or consecutive sentences for multiple offenses. As a result of the last few terms, many of the recent victories that the Department enjoyed in the political arena it lost in the courts. Under the administration of Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales, the Department continued its push for more stringent punishments, but changes in circumstances required a new approach. Congress considered and rejected new legislation that might constitutionally replicate DOJ's earlier coup. When DOJs Republican allies in Congress lost their majority position after the 2006 elections, the push for harsher punishments slowed considerably. We expect Attorney General Eric Holder to back away from harsh sentencing laws and tight control over Assistant United States Attorneys (AUSA) in the field. We now see federal district judges sentence below the range provided in the federal sentencing guidelines with building frequently, yet not ignore the guidelines. Though states judges never suffered in the same manner, we expect state legislators to react to the new constitutional requirement by increasing state judicial discretion in sentencing through advisory rather than mandatory guidelines, and expanding judicial authority to stack sentences. Note: This is the not always respectful designation of the Attorney General, other political appointees, and trial attorneys working on Pennsylvania Ave. and other downtown D.C. locations, as distinguished from the 94 U.S. Attorney's Offices located throughout the United States.\",\"PeriodicalId\":170753,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Tulsa Law Review\",\"volume\":\"25 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2009-06-13\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"2\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Tulsa Law Review\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1418622\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Tulsa Law Review","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1418622","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
摘要
过去几年,联邦系统中检察官、法官和国会在刑事量刑问题上的权力斗争取得了一些平衡。虽然我们已经分享了这个故事的片段,并分析了各种最高法院的量刑案例,但我们的独特贡献是解释了20世纪80年代中期开始的一场真正的量刑改革运动是如何以及为什么在本世纪初被联邦一级的保守派政治所采纳的,从而完全消除了所有联邦和州参与者的变革途径。第一部分属于主要法官。(见下文附注)正是在乔治·w·布什(George W. Bush)政府执政初期,司法部开始全面攻击联邦司法机构的量刑权力,作为巩固中央权威、要求对所有联邦定罪者处以最严厉刑罚的运动的一部分。司法部的运动同时在多个领域展开:(1)在国会,司法部敦促通过解决地区法院法官宽大处理问题的法律;(2)在美国量刑委员会(Commission)面前,司法部指责该委员会在从宽问题上做得不够;(3)甚至在其自己的外地办事处中,试图实际上消除检察官行使的传统指控自由裁量权,而强制要求所有联邦检察官提出可证明的最严重指控。最终,作为压垮最高法院的最后一根稻草,司法部成功地促使国会通过了《菲尼修正案》(Feeney Amendment),这项立法被视为对联邦法官量刑自由裁量权的正面攻击。尽管这场秀还远未结束,但正如我们在第二部分所解释的那样,最高法院在宪法基础上战胜了国会的立法(以及司法部的政治议程),重新占据了司法部和国会的上风。在美国诉布克案中,法院维持联邦量刑制度的总体合宪性,但前提是准则必须以纯粹咨询的方式适用,并须接受极其微弱的上诉审查。最高法院将国会移交给司法部的量刑权还给了法官。最高法院在2007年10月和2008年10月期间裁定的一系列附加第六修正案案件中重申了这一立场:Gall诉美国案、Kimbrough诉美国案(均在2007年10月期间审理)和Spears诉美国案(在2008年10月期间审理)通过严格限制上诉驳回,巩固了联邦地区法官的自由裁量权。最高法院似乎远不关心其意见对各州刑事司法系统的影响。这是合理的,因为大多数州没有强制性的量刑指导系统或推定量刑系统,那些州在他们的系统中建立了更多的司法灵活性,州立法者也没有与他们的司法机构发生冲突,法院的新宪法裁决实际上对州的影响明显小于联邦量刑。这并不是说,正如我们在第三部分中指出的那样,法院完全忽视了各州;两个顽固的州被明确地提醒了布莱克利/布克规则,最高法院在最近的判决中,俄勒冈诉Ice案(2008年10月开庭审理),通过对多项罪行实施并行或连续判决的做法,赋予了州审判法官更大的自由裁量权。由于前几个任期的结果,新闻部最近在政治舞台上取得的许多胜利都在法庭上失去了。在司法部长阿尔贝托·r·冈萨雷斯(Alberto R. Gonzales)的领导下,司法部继续推动更严厉的惩罚,但情况的变化需要一种新的方法。国会考虑并否决了可能在宪法上复制司法部早期政变的新立法。当司法部在国会的共和党盟友在2006年大选后失去多数席位时,要求更严厉惩罚的努力大幅放缓。我们希望司法部长埃里克·霍尔德(Eric Holder)放弃严厉的量刑法律,并严格控制该领域的助理联邦检察官(AUSA)。我们现在看到,联邦地区法官的量刑低于联邦量刑指南规定的范围的情况越来越多,但并没有忽视联邦量刑指南。虽然州法官从未遭受过同样的痛苦,但我们希望州立法者对新的宪法要求做出反应,通过咨询而不是强制性指导来增加州司法在量刑方面的自由裁量权,并扩大司法权力以加重量刑。注:这并不总是司法部长、其他政治任命人员和在宾夕法尼亚大道和其他华盛顿市中心工作的审判律师的尊称,与遍布美国的94个联邦检察官办公室不同。
DOJ's Attack on Federal Judicial Leniency, the Supreme Court's Response, and the Future of Criminal Sentencing
The last few years have brought some equilibrium to the power struggle in the federal system between prosecutors, judges, and Congress over criminal sentencing. Though pieces of this story have been shared and various Supreme Court sentencing cases analyzed, our unique contribution is to explain how and why a true sentencing reform movement that began in the mid-1980's was co-opted by conservative politics at the federal level at the turn of this century, thereby eliminating one avenue of change entirely for all federal and state actors. Part I belongs to Main Justice. (see Note below) It was during the early days of George W. Bush's administration that the Department of Justice began its all-out assault on the federal judiciary's sentencing powers as part of a campaign to consolidate central authority and to require the harshest possible sentences for all federal convictions. DOJ's campaign was played out in numerous arenas at the same time: (1) in Congress, where DOJ urged the adoption of laws addressing the problem of leniency of district court judges; (2) before the U.S. Sentencing Commission (Commission), which DOJ chided for not doing enough about the leniency problem; and (3) even among its own field offices by attempting to virtually eliminate the traditional charging discretion exercised by prosecutors and instead mandating that all federal prosecutors bring the most serious charges provable. Eventually, as the straw that broke the Court's back, the Department succeeded in prompting Congress to enact the Feeney Amendment, a piece of legislation that was viewed as a frontal assault on the discretion of federal judges in sentencing. Though the show is far from over, the Supreme Court regained the upper hand over both DOJ and Congress, as we explain in Part II, by trumping Congress's legislation (and DOJ's political agenda) on constitutional grounds. In United States v. Booker the Court upheld the overall constitutionality of the federal sentencing system but only on the condition that the Guidelines be applied in a purely advisory manner, subject to extremely weak appellate review for reasonableness. The Supreme Court gave the power over sentencing that Congress had transferred to DOJ back to judges. The Court reaffirmed that position in a series of additional Sixth Amendment cases decided in the October 2007 and 2008 Terms: Gall v. United States, Kimbrough v. United States, (both heard in the October 2007 Term) and Spears v. United States, (heard in the October 2008 Term) firmed federal district judge discretion through rigid limits on appellate reversals. The Court appeared far less concerned with the effects of its opinions on state criminal justice systems. This was sensible, as most states don't have mandatory sentencing guideline systems or presumptive sentencing systems, those states that do build more judicial flexibility in their systems, and state legislators are not at war with their judiciary, the Court's new constitutional rulings in fact had significantly less effect on state than on federal sentencing. This is not to say, as we note in Part III, that the Court entirely ignored the states; two recalcitrant states were pointedly reminded of the Blakely/Booker rule, and the Court in its most recent sentencing decision, Oregon v. Ice, (heard in the October 2008 Term) granted state trial judges even more discretion through the practice of imposing concurrent or consecutive sentences for multiple offenses. As a result of the last few terms, many of the recent victories that the Department enjoyed in the political arena it lost in the courts. Under the administration of Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales, the Department continued its push for more stringent punishments, but changes in circumstances required a new approach. Congress considered and rejected new legislation that might constitutionally replicate DOJ's earlier coup. When DOJs Republican allies in Congress lost their majority position after the 2006 elections, the push for harsher punishments slowed considerably. We expect Attorney General Eric Holder to back away from harsh sentencing laws and tight control over Assistant United States Attorneys (AUSA) in the field. We now see federal district judges sentence below the range provided in the federal sentencing guidelines with building frequently, yet not ignore the guidelines. Though states judges never suffered in the same manner, we expect state legislators to react to the new constitutional requirement by increasing state judicial discretion in sentencing through advisory rather than mandatory guidelines, and expanding judicial authority to stack sentences. Note: This is the not always respectful designation of the Attorney General, other political appointees, and trial attorneys working on Pennsylvania Ave. and other downtown D.C. locations, as distinguished from the 94 U.S. Attorney's Offices located throughout the United States.