利用经验内部威胁案例数据设计缓解策略

Dawn M. Cappelli
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引用次数: 1

摘要

1. 了解内部威胁的复杂性根据卡内基梅隆大学软件工程研究所的CERT项目(CERT)的研究,大约一半的组织每年至少经历一次由内部人员实施的电子犯罪。这些罪行包括盗窃、破坏、欺诈和间谍活动。CERT于2001年开始研究这个问题。它编制了一个数据库,其中包含500多起刑事案件,这些案件涉及现任或前任雇员、承包商或商业伙伴滥用与职位相关的信任和权限。作为研究的一部分,CERT采访了许多受害组织。它还采访了一些犯罪者本人,通过对这些犯罪背后的方法和动机的第一手见解来补充丰富的案件数据。
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Using empirical insider threat case data to design a mitigation strategy
1. Understanding the Complexity of Insider Threat According to research by the CERT Program (CERT) in the Software Engineering Institute at Carnegie Mellon University, approximately half of all organizat1ons experience at least one electronic crime perpetrated by an insider each year. These crimes include theft, sabotage, fraud, and espionage. CERT began researching this problem in 2001. It has compiled a database of more than 500 criminal cases in which current or former employees, contractors, or business partners abused the trust and access associated with their positions. As part of its research, CERT interviewed many victim organizations. It also interviewed some perpetrators themselves, complementing a wealth of case data with first-hand insights into the methods and motivations behind these crimes.
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