格拉斯哥对哈斯兰格、杰弗斯和斯宾塞的答复

Joshua Glasgow, S. Haslanger, Chike Jeffers, Quayshawn Spencer
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引用次数: 2

摘要

在第四章中,约书亚·格拉斯哥认为,普通意义上的种族是这样定义的,种族不可能是一种社会建构,也不是一种生物学现实。那一章的结论是要么种族是不真实的,要么即使种族是真实的,它也以一种非常基本的方式是真实的,而不是被社会或生物学事实所捕获。在本章中,格拉斯哥通过对哈斯兰格、杰弗斯和斯宾塞的回应来发展他的观点。在澄清了一些关于种族反实在论的误解之后,格拉斯哥解释了他反对建构主义的论点如何适用于哈斯兰格和杰弗斯的具体建构主义理论。然后,他探讨了斯宾塞的观点是如何受到不匹配反对的影响的,并进一步指出,它面临着考虑一些核心交流类型的额外问题。本章还包括一个附录,该附录探讨了本书中提出的理论之间如何共享广泛的方法论基础。
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Glasgow’s Reply to Haslanger, Jeffers, and Spencer
In Chapter 4, Joshua Glasgow argued that race in the ordinary sense is defined in such a way that race cannot be a social construction and is not a biological reality. That chapter concluded with the claim that either race is not real, or if it is, it is real in a very basic way that is not captured by social or biological facts. In this chapter, Glasgow develops his view by responding to Haslanger, Jeffers, and Spencer. After first clearing up some misconceptions about racial anti-realism, Glasgow explains how his argument against constructionism applies to Haslanger’s and Jeffers’s specific constructionist theories. He then explores how Spencer’s view is exposed to a mismatch objection and further argues that it faces additional problems of accounting for some central kinds of communication. This chapter also includes an Appendix that explores how a wide methodological ground is shared among the theories presented in this book.
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Spencer’s Reply to Glasgow, Haslanger, and Jeffers Glasgow’s Reply to Haslanger, Jeffers, and Spencer How to Be a Biological Racial Realist Haslanger’s Reply to Glasgow, Jeffers, and Spencer Is Race an Illusion or a (Very) Basic Reality?
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