一种允许撤销投票的新协议——混合投票系统

Oliver Spycher, R. Haenni
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引用次数: 6

摘要

混合投票系统允许选民在投票站撤销他们的电子投票。这种方法的目的是提供充分的个人和普遍的可核查性,而不引入购买选票或强迫选民的威胁。这种传统和电子投票系统的整合要求选民有能力证明他们是否已经通过电子方式投票,如果是的话,还要显示在公共公告栏上公布的所有电子投票中,哪一张是他们的。本文以完整的密码学细节提出了一种新的电子投票协议,该协议允许选民明确地向投票站的投票官员展示和证明他们是否投了电子票。如果是这种情况,选民可以使用他们的秘密凭证在公共公告板上找到他们的投票,而不放弃凭证的保密性。值得注意的是,我们的协议允许他们这样做,即使他们的投票是由掌握他们凭证的第三方投的。因此,我们处理对选民投票权的最严厉的攻击。此外,与纯粹的电子投票系统不同,我们的协议允许混合系统提供抗胁迫性,即使选民被允许投票给自填候选人。我们的方法旨在吸引旨在为选民提供两种投票渠道选择的政府,而不是用电子投票系统完全取代传统的纸质投票方案
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A novel protocol to allow revocation of votes a hybrid voting system
A hybrid voting system allows voters to revoke their electronic vote at the polling station. This approach is meant to provide full individual and universal verifiability without introducing the threats of vote buying or voter coercion. Such an integration of traditional and electronic voting systems requires the voters' ability to prove whether they have already voted electronically, and if so, to show which of all the electronic votes published on the public bulletin board is theirs. This paper proposes in full cryptographic detail a novel e-voting protocol that allows voters to unambiguously show and prove to voting officials at the polling station if they have cast an electronic vote. If this is the case, the voters can use their secret credentials to locate their votes on the public bulletin board without giving up the secrecy of the credentials. Remarkably, our protocol enables them to do so, even if their votes have been cast by a third party that got hold of their credentials. We thus address the hardest possible attack on a voter's right to vote. Furthermore, unlike pure e-voting systems, our protocol allows the hybrid system to provide coercion-resistance even when voters are allowed to vote for write-in candidates. Our approach is meant to appeal to governments that aim at offering voters the choice between two channels for casting votes, rather than fully replacing their traditional paper-based voting scheme with an e-voting system.1
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