AMI威胁、入侵检测需求和部署建议

David Grochocki, J. Huh, R. Berthier, R. Bobba, W. Sanders, A. Cárdenas, Jorjeta G. Jetcheva
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引用次数: 106

摘要

高级计量基础设施(AMI)促进了智能电表和公用事业之间的双向通信,允许可靠有效地共享有关消耗、停电和电价的信息。然而,通过网状网络连接的众多智能电表为攻击者干扰通信、破坏公用事业资产或窃取客户私人信息提供了新的机会。本文的目的是调查ami面临的各种威胁以及用于实现这些威胁的常见攻击技术,以便识别和理解全面入侵检测解决方案的需求。威胁分析导致了一个广泛的“攻击树”,它捕获了攻击者的关键目标(例如,能源盗窃)和实现这些目标所涉及的单个攻击步骤(例如,窃听网络)。参照攻击树,我们展示了有效检测攻击所需的信息类型。我们还建议,在监控攻击方面,可以通过混合传感基础设施提供最广泛的覆盖范围,该基础设施使用集中式入侵检测系统和嵌入式仪表传感器。
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AMI threats, intrusion detection requirements and deployment recommendations
Advanced Metering Infrastructures (AMI) facilitate bidirectional communication between smart meters and utilities, allowing information about consumption, outages, and electricity rates to be shared reliably and efficiently. However, the numerous smart meters being connected through mesh networks open new opportunities for attackers to interfere with communications and compromise utilities' assets or steal customers' private information. The goal of this paper is to survey the various threats facing AMIs and the common attack techniques used to realize them in order to identify and understand the requirements for a comprehensive intrusion detection solution. The threat analysis leads to an extensive “attack tree” that captures the attackers' key objectives (e.g., energy theft) and the individual attack steps (e.g., eavesdropping on the network) that would be involved in achieving them. With reference to the attack tree, we show the type of information that would be required to effectively detect attacks. We also suggest that the widest coverage in monitoring the attacks can be provided by a hybrid sensing infrastructure that uses both a centralized intrusion detection system and embedded meter sensors.
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