侵犯隐私权的利益救济

K. Barnett
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文考虑了为什么对侵犯隐私行为给予基于收益的救济并不常见。这有三个原因。首先,有两种可能的基于收益的救济措施:合理收费和利润账户。对于后者,利润账户是一种个人补救措施,但专有的建设性信托有时也可以用来实现类似的结果。其次,诉因的性质存在不确定性,尤其是在澳大利亚。特定种类的基于收益的救济的可得性通常以特定诉因的历史起源为依据。不幸的是,侵犯隐私的分类是不确定的,它既被视为一种侵权行为,也被视为一种公平的失信行为。这对补救措施的可用性产生了影响,特别是在澳大利亚。对于衡平法的诉因,更有可能给予衡平法对利润的衡平法救济,而对于普通法的诉因,只有在例外情况下才给予。相比之下,合理的费用裁决更有可能适用于某些侵权行为。第三,利润的账目通常是笨拙而难以计算的,法院发现很难将利润分配给违约行为。有人建议,对侵犯隐私的补救措施应与关于历史起源的辩论分开。相反,重点应放在诉因的规范基础上(无论是被认为是公平的还是侵权的,还是两者兼而有之),因为这将决定应当采取何种补救措施。有人会建议,对于侵犯隐私的行为,应该提供利润账目,但只有在补偿性损害赔偿不足、无法获得禁制令、被告的违约行为是故意的并且被告获得了利润的情况下才可以。此外,应通过颠倒举证责任,并要求被告证明任何净利润都不能归因于违约,来解决上述计算困难。相比之下,有人会辩称,不应该做出合理的费用裁决,也不应该使用凯恩斯勋爵法案(即使是在一种善意的解释中)来实现基于收益的裁决。
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Gain-Based Relief for Breach of Privacy
This paper considers why awards of gain-based relief for breach of privacy are uncommon. There are three reasons for this. First, there are arguably two possible measures of gain-based relief: the reasonable fee and the account of profits. In relation to the latter, the account of profits is a personal remedy, but the proprietary constructive trust can also sometimes be used to achieve a similar result. Second, there is uncertainty about the nature of the cause of action, particularly in Australia. The availability of specific kinds of gain-based relief has generally been predicated on the historical origin of the particular cause of action. Unfortunately, the categorisation of breach of privacy is uncertain, and it has been seen both as a tort and as a species of equitable breach of confidence. This has ramifications for the availability of remedies, particularly in Australia. The equitable remedy of account of profits is more likely to be awarded for equitable causes of action, and only exceptionally for common law causes of action, if at all. By contrast, reasonable fee awards are more likely to be available for certain torts. Thirdly, accounts of profits are generally unwieldy and difficult to calculate, and courts find it difficult to apportion profits to the breach. It is suggested that the remedies available for breach of privacy should be uncoupled from the debates about historical origin. Instead the focus should be upon the normative basis of the cause of action (whether it is conceived of as equitable or tortious, or as a mixture of both), as this will determine what remedies should be available. It will be suggested that accounts of profit should be available for breach of privacy, but only exceptionally, where compensatory damages are inadequate, an injunction is unavailable, the defendant’s breach was advertent and the defendant made a profit. Moreover the difficulties of calculation mentioned above should be dealt with by reversing the burden of proof, and requiring the defendant to show that any net profit was not attributable to the breach. By contrast, it will be argued that reasonable fee awards should not be made, and nor should Lord Cairns’ Act be used (even in a beneficent interpretation) to enable gain-based awards.
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