{"title":"无辜的人什么时候认罪?","authors":"Alex Lundberg","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3100845","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The implications of a strategic model of plea bargaining are threefold. First, prosecutors induce the innocent to plead guilty when trial costs are high. Second, plea bargaining unequivocally increases wrongful convictions. Lastly, police share an important role in minimizing wrongful convictions. Law enforcement cannot rely on prosecutors to sort the guilty from the innocent.","PeriodicalId":268118,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Procedure (Criminal Procedure) (Topic)","volume":"62 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2018-01-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"4","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"When Do the Innocent Plead Guilty?\",\"authors\":\"Alex Lundberg\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.3100845\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The implications of a strategic model of plea bargaining are threefold. First, prosecutors induce the innocent to plead guilty when trial costs are high. Second, plea bargaining unequivocally increases wrongful convictions. Lastly, police share an important role in minimizing wrongful convictions. Law enforcement cannot rely on prosecutors to sort the guilty from the innocent.\",\"PeriodicalId\":268118,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"LSN: Procedure (Criminal Procedure) (Topic)\",\"volume\":\"62 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2018-01-12\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"4\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"LSN: Procedure (Criminal Procedure) (Topic)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3100845\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"LSN: Procedure (Criminal Procedure) (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3100845","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
The implications of a strategic model of plea bargaining are threefold. First, prosecutors induce the innocent to plead guilty when trial costs are high. Second, plea bargaining unequivocally increases wrongful convictions. Lastly, police share an important role in minimizing wrongful convictions. Law enforcement cannot rely on prosecutors to sort the guilty from the innocent.
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