作为行政时代的通灵者

Drury D. Stevenson, S. Eckhart
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摘要

几十年来,法院在处理公民诉讼时,一直采用司法上制定的诉讼时效规则。这些诉讼资格的要求是含糊不清的,不可行的,往往只是作为一种审查机制来管理案卷。使用常设规则来筛选案件,反过来又产生了不一致的裁决,法庭沿着党派路线分裂,这表明法院在公民诉讼中使用这些规则作为是非事实的代表。因此,许多评论家和一些最高法院法官建议,国会可以或应该为诉讼资格提供立法指导。本文将这一建议进一步推进,并认为国会已含蓄地将该事项委托给对该主题具有主要执法权的行政机构。法院通常允许机构填补各自法规中的空白,这意味着国会在某一点上保持沉默,往往构成了负责执行法规的机构的自由裁量余地。各机构已经拥有明确的法定权力,可以预先阻止公民诉讼或确定当事人可以起诉的违法行为。因此,现有的法律框架表明,行政机关可以颁布关于公民诉讼中事实损害和因果关系方面的规则。此外,就所涉及的危害和最适合代表公共利益的专业知识而言,机构比法院具有优势。在更微妙的公民起诉机构本身的问题上,机构可能不遵守“对各州的特别关怀”规则,这在马萨诸塞州诉环保署案中得到了说明。最后,这篇文章解释了通过允许机构将公民诉讼与更大的公共利益和既定的政策目标更紧密地结合起来,诉讼资格如何成为一种有益的渠道工具,而不是一种尴尬的筛选工具。
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Standing as Channeling in the Administrative Age
For several decades, courts have approached citizen suits with judicially created rules for standing. These requirements for standing have been vague and unworkable, and often serve merely as a screening mechanism for docket management. The use of standing rules to screen cases, in turn, yields inconsistent decisions and tribunal splits along partisan lines, suggesting that courts are using these rules in citizen suits as a proxy for the merits. Numerous commentators, and some Supreme Court Justices, have therefore suggested that Congress could, or should, provide legislative guidelines for standing. This Article takes the suggestion a step further, and argues that Congress has implicitly delegated the matter to the administrative agencies with primary enforcement authority over the subject matter. Courts regularly allow agencies to fill gaps in their respective statutes, meaning congressional silence on a point often constitutes discretionary leeway for the agency charged with implementation of the statute. Agencies already have explicit statutory authority to preempt citizen suits or define violations for which parties may sue. The existing statutory framework therefore suggests agencies could promulgate rules for the injury-in-fact and causation prongs of standing in citizen suits. Moreover, agencies have an advantage over courts in terms of expertise about the harms involved and which suits best represent the public interest. On the more delicate question of citizen suits against agencies themselves, agencies could default to the “special solicitude for states” rule illustrated in Massachusetts v. EPA. Finally, this Article explains how standing can function as a beneficial channeling tool rather than an awkward screening device, by allowing agencies to align citizen suits more closely with the larger public interest and established policy goals.
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