差异化产品市场中的设计外包:议价和范围经济的作用

Q. Feng, Lauren Xiaoyuan Lu
{"title":"差异化产品市场中的设计外包:议价和范围经济的作用","authors":"Q. Feng, Lauren Xiaoyuan Lu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2986185","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In the electronics industry and beyond, original design manufacturers (ODMs) provide a full spectrum of services, ranging from design and development to manufacturing, to original equipment manufacturers (OEMs). Through resource pooling, ODMs benefit from scope economies when designing different products for multiple OEMs. Such design outsourcing practices, however, stir concerns that it may dilute product differentiation and subsequently intensify market competition. To examine the strategic impact of design outsourcing, we develop a game-theoretical model with a single ODM and two competing OEMs. The ODM has two divisions to serve the OEMs separately. The OEMs engage in a differentiated price competition over the Hotelling Line with product locations endogenously chosen by the parties who design the products. A wholesale-price contract is negotiated bilaterally between an ODM division and her OEM customer, and design outsourcing may reduce an OEM’s bargaining power. We compare two scenarios: (1)The ODM divisions establish dedicated resources and act as independent profit maximizers; (2)The ODM divisions cooperate through resource pooling and benefit from scope economies in both design and manufacturing. Our results highlight the role of bargaining in shaping the OEMs’ design sourcing decisions. In particular, whether the OEMs outsource design in equilibrium critically depends on the degree of asymmetry between their bargaining powers vis-a-vis the ODM. With similar bargaining power, the OEMs are more likely to outsource when they become stronger relative to the ODM. With significantly different bargaining power, surprisingly, the strong OEM tends to insource while the weak one tends to outsource. Scope economies may induce the ODM to decrease product differentiation between the products she designs for her OEM customers, and this tendency increases as the OEMs’ bargaining power strengthens. Ceding bargaining power, therefore, can be used by an OEM as an incentive lever to influence the ODM’s design decisions.","PeriodicalId":369181,"journal":{"name":"Operations Strategy eJournal","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2010-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"9","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Design Outsourcing in a Differentiated Product Market: The Role of Bargaining and Scope Economies\",\"authors\":\"Q. Feng, Lauren Xiaoyuan Lu\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.2986185\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"In the electronics industry and beyond, original design manufacturers (ODMs) provide a full spectrum of services, ranging from design and development to manufacturing, to original equipment manufacturers (OEMs). Through resource pooling, ODMs benefit from scope economies when designing different products for multiple OEMs. Such design outsourcing practices, however, stir concerns that it may dilute product differentiation and subsequently intensify market competition. To examine the strategic impact of design outsourcing, we develop a game-theoretical model with a single ODM and two competing OEMs. The ODM has two divisions to serve the OEMs separately. The OEMs engage in a differentiated price competition over the Hotelling Line with product locations endogenously chosen by the parties who design the products. A wholesale-price contract is negotiated bilaterally between an ODM division and her OEM customer, and design outsourcing may reduce an OEM’s bargaining power. We compare two scenarios: (1)The ODM divisions establish dedicated resources and act as independent profit maximizers; (2)The ODM divisions cooperate through resource pooling and benefit from scope economies in both design and manufacturing. Our results highlight the role of bargaining in shaping the OEMs’ design sourcing decisions. In particular, whether the OEMs outsource design in equilibrium critically depends on the degree of asymmetry between their bargaining powers vis-a-vis the ODM. With similar bargaining power, the OEMs are more likely to outsource when they become stronger relative to the ODM. With significantly different bargaining power, surprisingly, the strong OEM tends to insource while the weak one tends to outsource. Scope economies may induce the ODM to decrease product differentiation between the products she designs for her OEM customers, and this tendency increases as the OEMs’ bargaining power strengthens. Ceding bargaining power, therefore, can be used by an OEM as an incentive lever to influence the ODM’s design decisions.\",\"PeriodicalId\":369181,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Operations Strategy eJournal\",\"volume\":\"39 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2010-09-13\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"9\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Operations Strategy eJournal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2986185\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Operations Strategy eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2986185","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 9

摘要

在电子行业及其他行业,原始设计制造商(odm)提供全方位的服务,从设计和开发到制造,再到原始设备制造商(oem)。通过资源池,odm在为多个oem设计不同的产品时可以从范围经济中获益。然而,这种设计外包的做法引发了人们的担忧,即它可能会淡化产品的差异化,从而加剧市场竞争。为了检验设计外包的战略影响,我们建立了一个包含单个ODM和两个竞争oem的博弈论模型。ODM有两个部门分别为oem服务。原始设备制造商在酒店线上进行差异化价格竞争,产品位置由产品设计方内生选择。批发价格合同是ODM部门与其OEM客户之间的双边谈判,设计外包可能会降低OEM的议价能力。我们比较了两种情景:(1)ODM部门建立专用资源并作为独立的利润最大化者;(2) ODM部门通过资源池进行合作,并从设计和制造的范围经济中受益。我们的研究结果强调了议价在oem设计采购决策中的作用。特别是,原始设备制造商是否在均衡状态下外包设计,关键取决于他们与原始设备制造商之间议价能力的不对称程度。拥有类似议价能力的原始设备制造商,当他们相对于原始设备制造商变得更强大时,更有可能外包。在议价能力显著不同的情况下,令人惊讶的是,实力强的OEM倾向于内包,实力弱的OEM倾向于外包。范围经济可能导致ODM减少其为OEM客户设计的产品之间的产品差异,并且随着OEM议价能力的增强,这种趋势会增加。因此,OEM可以将放弃议价能力作为一种激励杠杆来影响ODM的设计决策。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
Design Outsourcing in a Differentiated Product Market: The Role of Bargaining and Scope Economies
In the electronics industry and beyond, original design manufacturers (ODMs) provide a full spectrum of services, ranging from design and development to manufacturing, to original equipment manufacturers (OEMs). Through resource pooling, ODMs benefit from scope economies when designing different products for multiple OEMs. Such design outsourcing practices, however, stir concerns that it may dilute product differentiation and subsequently intensify market competition. To examine the strategic impact of design outsourcing, we develop a game-theoretical model with a single ODM and two competing OEMs. The ODM has two divisions to serve the OEMs separately. The OEMs engage in a differentiated price competition over the Hotelling Line with product locations endogenously chosen by the parties who design the products. A wholesale-price contract is negotiated bilaterally between an ODM division and her OEM customer, and design outsourcing may reduce an OEM’s bargaining power. We compare two scenarios: (1)The ODM divisions establish dedicated resources and act as independent profit maximizers; (2)The ODM divisions cooperate through resource pooling and benefit from scope economies in both design and manufacturing. Our results highlight the role of bargaining in shaping the OEMs’ design sourcing decisions. In particular, whether the OEMs outsource design in equilibrium critically depends on the degree of asymmetry between their bargaining powers vis-a-vis the ODM. With similar bargaining power, the OEMs are more likely to outsource when they become stronger relative to the ODM. With significantly different bargaining power, surprisingly, the strong OEM tends to insource while the weak one tends to outsource. Scope economies may induce the ODM to decrease product differentiation between the products she designs for her OEM customers, and this tendency increases as the OEMs’ bargaining power strengthens. Ceding bargaining power, therefore, can be used by an OEM as an incentive lever to influence the ODM’s design decisions.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
期刊最新文献
Retailers’ product assortment decisions during the Great Recession: Evidence from the U.S. yogurt market Sourcing from a Self-Reporting Supplier: Strategic Communication of Social Responsibility in a Supply Chain Estimating the Demand Spillover Effect of Inventory Stockouts in a Fashion Footwear Retail Setting Blockchain-Enabled Traceability in Food Supply Chain Networks Analyzing Promotion Effectiveness in Fashion Retailing Using Quantile Regression
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1