数字匹配平台设计的仿真方法

Andrey Fradkin
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引用次数: 13

摘要

数字匹配市场具有用户异质性、容量有限、市场出清动态等特点。这些特性会在用户之间产生溢出效应。例如,一位客人预订的Airbnb房源不能被另一位客人预订到同一晚。溢出效应限制了评估市场政策效果的许多实验和观察方法的适用性。在本文中,我将展示如何使用市场模拟作为用户获取策略和排名算法设计的输入。我使用Airbnb上的搜索和交易数据校准了一个市场模拟,并用它来解决三个主题:匹配中的规模回报、用户获取回报的异质性,以及实验设计中的偏差大小。我发现规模回报最初由于市场厚度效应而增加,然后由于搜索中的可用性摩擦而减少。此外,房源对平台价值的异质性很大——根据房源质量的四分位数,获得25%以上房源对预订的影响在-4.1%到5.4%之间。然后,我测量了由于溢出效应而导致的实验治疗效果的偏差程度。当四分之一的用户被随机分配到治疗中时,更好的排名算法对转化率的治疗效果被夸大了53%。
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A Simulation Approach to Designing Digital Matching Platforms
Digital matching marketplaces are characterized by user heterogeneity, limited capacity, and dynamic market clearing. These features create spillovers between users. For example, an Airbnb listing booked by one guest cannot be booked by another guest for the same night. Spillovers limit the applicability of many experimental and observational methods for evaluating the effects of marketplace policies. In this paper, I show how to use marketplace simulations as an input into the design of user acquisition strategies and ranking algorithms. I calibrate a marketplace simulation using data on searches and transactions from Airbnb and use it to address three topics: the returns to scale in matching, the heterogeneity in returns to user acquisition, and the size of bias in experimental designs. I find that returns to scale are initially increasing due to market thickness effects and then decreasing due to availability frictions in search. Furthermore, heterogeneity in the value of listings to the platform is large - the effect of acquiring 25% more listings on bookings varies between -4.1% and 5.4% depending on the quartile of listing quality. I then measure the extent of bias in experimental treatment effects due to spillovers. The treatment effect of a better ranking algorithm on conversion rates is overstated by 53% when a quarter of users are randomized into treatment.
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