{"title":"忠诚度折扣和价格成本测试","authors":"G. Calzolari, V. Denicoló","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3173756","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We analyze, by means of a formal economic model, the use of price-cost tests to assess the competitive effects of loyalty discounts. In the model, a dominant firm enjoys a competitive advantage over its rivals and uses loyalty discounts as a means to boost the demand for its product. We show that in this framework price-cost tests are misleading or, at best, completely uninformative. Our results cast doubts on the applicability of price-tests to loyalty discount cases.","PeriodicalId":169574,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Entry & Exit (Topic)","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2018-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"7","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Loyalty Discounts and Price-Cost Tests\",\"authors\":\"G. Calzolari, V. Denicoló\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.3173756\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We analyze, by means of a formal economic model, the use of price-cost tests to assess the competitive effects of loyalty discounts. In the model, a dominant firm enjoys a competitive advantage over its rivals and uses loyalty discounts as a means to boost the demand for its product. We show that in this framework price-cost tests are misleading or, at best, completely uninformative. Our results cast doubts on the applicability of price-tests to loyalty discount cases.\",\"PeriodicalId\":169574,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"ERN: Entry & Exit (Topic)\",\"volume\":\"37 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2018-05-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"7\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"ERN: Entry & Exit (Topic)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3173756\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ERN: Entry & Exit (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3173756","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
We analyze, by means of a formal economic model, the use of price-cost tests to assess the competitive effects of loyalty discounts. In the model, a dominant firm enjoys a competitive advantage over its rivals and uses loyalty discounts as a means to boost the demand for its product. We show that in this framework price-cost tests are misleading or, at best, completely uninformative. Our results cast doubts on the applicability of price-tests to loyalty discount cases.
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