佛罗多:摘下魔戒!实用,量子安全密钥交换从LWE

Joppe W. Bos, Craig Costello, L. Ducas, Ilya Mironov, M. Naehrig, V. Nikolaenko, A. Raghunathan, D. Stebila
{"title":"佛罗多:摘下魔戒!实用,量子安全密钥交换从LWE","authors":"Joppe W. Bos, Craig Costello, L. Ducas, Ilya Mironov, M. Naehrig, V. Nikolaenko, A. Raghunathan, D. Stebila","doi":"10.1145/2976749.2978425","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Lattice-based cryptography offers some of the most attractive primitives believed to be resistant to quantum computers. Following increasing interest from both companies and government agencies in building quantum computers, a number of works have proposed instantiations of practical post-quantum key exchange protocols based on hard problems in ideal lattices, mainly based on the Ring Learning With Errors (R-LWE) problem. While ideal lattices facilitate major efficiency and storage benefits over their non-ideal counterparts, the additional ring structure that enables these advantages also raises concerns about the assumed difficulty of the underlying problems. Thus, a question of significant interest to cryptographers, and especially to those currently placing bets on primitives that will withstand quantum adversaries, is how much of an advantage the additional ring structure actually gives in practice. Despite conventional wisdom that generic lattices might be too slow and unwieldy, we demonstrate that LWE-based key exchange is quite practical: our constant time implementation requires around 1.3ms computation time for each party; compared to the recent NewHope R-LWE scheme, communication sizes increase by a factor of 4.7x, but remain under 12 KiB in each direction. Our protocol is competitive when used for serving web pages over TLS; when partnered with ECDSA signatures, latencies increase by less than a factor of 1.6x, and (even under heavy load) server throughput only decreases by factors of 1.5x and 1.2x when serving typical 1 KiB and 100 KiB pages, respectively. To achieve these practical results, our protocol takes advantage of several innovations. These include techniques to optimize communication bandwidth, dynamic generation of public parameters (which also offers additional security against backdoors), carefully chosen error distributions, and tight security parameters.","PeriodicalId":432261,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"113 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2016-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"344","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Frodo: Take off the Ring! Practical, Quantum-Secure Key Exchange from LWE\",\"authors\":\"Joppe W. Bos, Craig Costello, L. Ducas, Ilya Mironov, M. Naehrig, V. Nikolaenko, A. Raghunathan, D. Stebila\",\"doi\":\"10.1145/2976749.2978425\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Lattice-based cryptography offers some of the most attractive primitives believed to be resistant to quantum computers. Following increasing interest from both companies and government agencies in building quantum computers, a number of works have proposed instantiations of practical post-quantum key exchange protocols based on hard problems in ideal lattices, mainly based on the Ring Learning With Errors (R-LWE) problem. While ideal lattices facilitate major efficiency and storage benefits over their non-ideal counterparts, the additional ring structure that enables these advantages also raises concerns about the assumed difficulty of the underlying problems. Thus, a question of significant interest to cryptographers, and especially to those currently placing bets on primitives that will withstand quantum adversaries, is how much of an advantage the additional ring structure actually gives in practice. Despite conventional wisdom that generic lattices might be too slow and unwieldy, we demonstrate that LWE-based key exchange is quite practical: our constant time implementation requires around 1.3ms computation time for each party; compared to the recent NewHope R-LWE scheme, communication sizes increase by a factor of 4.7x, but remain under 12 KiB in each direction. Our protocol is competitive when used for serving web pages over TLS; when partnered with ECDSA signatures, latencies increase by less than a factor of 1.6x, and (even under heavy load) server throughput only decreases by factors of 1.5x and 1.2x when serving typical 1 KiB and 100 KiB pages, respectively. To achieve these practical results, our protocol takes advantage of several innovations. These include techniques to optimize communication bandwidth, dynamic generation of public parameters (which also offers additional security against backdoors), carefully chosen error distributions, and tight security parameters.\",\"PeriodicalId\":432261,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security\",\"volume\":\"113 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2016-10-24\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"344\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1145/2976749.2978425\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2976749.2978425","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 344

摘要

基于点阵的密码学提供了一些最具吸引力的原语,被认为可以抵抗量子计算机。随着公司和政府机构对构建量子计算机的兴趣日益浓厚,许多工作已经提出了基于理想格中困难问题的实用后量子密钥交换协议的实例,主要基于带错误的环学习(R-LWE)问题。虽然理想的晶格比非理想的晶格更能提高效率和存储能力,但额外的环结构也使这些优势得以实现,这也引起了人们对潜在问题的假定难度的担忧。因此,密码学家非常感兴趣的一个问题,特别是那些目前押注原语能够抵御量子对手的人,就是额外的环结构在实践中实际能带来多大的优势。尽管传统观点认为通用格可能太慢且笨拙,但我们证明了基于lwe的密钥交换是非常实用的:我们的常数时间实现对每一方需要大约1.3ms的计算时间;与最近的NewHope R-LWE方案相比,通信规模增加了4.7倍,但每个方向的通信规模仍低于12 KiB。我们的协议在通过TLS提供网页服务时具有竞争力;当与ECDSA签名合作时,延迟增加不到1.6倍,并且(即使在高负载下)服务器吞吐量仅在提供典型的1 KiB和100 KiB页面时分别减少1.5倍和1.2倍。为了达到这些实际效果,我们的协议利用了几个创新。这些技术包括优化通信带宽、动态生成公共参数(这也提供了针对后门的额外安全性)、精心选择的错误分布和严格的安全参数。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
Frodo: Take off the Ring! Practical, Quantum-Secure Key Exchange from LWE
Lattice-based cryptography offers some of the most attractive primitives believed to be resistant to quantum computers. Following increasing interest from both companies and government agencies in building quantum computers, a number of works have proposed instantiations of practical post-quantum key exchange protocols based on hard problems in ideal lattices, mainly based on the Ring Learning With Errors (R-LWE) problem. While ideal lattices facilitate major efficiency and storage benefits over their non-ideal counterparts, the additional ring structure that enables these advantages also raises concerns about the assumed difficulty of the underlying problems. Thus, a question of significant interest to cryptographers, and especially to those currently placing bets on primitives that will withstand quantum adversaries, is how much of an advantage the additional ring structure actually gives in practice. Despite conventional wisdom that generic lattices might be too slow and unwieldy, we demonstrate that LWE-based key exchange is quite practical: our constant time implementation requires around 1.3ms computation time for each party; compared to the recent NewHope R-LWE scheme, communication sizes increase by a factor of 4.7x, but remain under 12 KiB in each direction. Our protocol is competitive when used for serving web pages over TLS; when partnered with ECDSA signatures, latencies increase by less than a factor of 1.6x, and (even under heavy load) server throughput only decreases by factors of 1.5x and 1.2x when serving typical 1 KiB and 100 KiB pages, respectively. To achieve these practical results, our protocol takes advantage of several innovations. These include techniques to optimize communication bandwidth, dynamic generation of public parameters (which also offers additional security against backdoors), carefully chosen error distributions, and tight security parameters.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
期刊最新文献
∑oφoς: Forward Secure Searchable Encryption Accessorize to a Crime: Real and Stealthy Attacks on State-of-the-Art Face Recognition Message-Recovery Attacks on Feistel-Based Format Preserving Encryption iLock: Immediate and Automatic Locking of Mobile Devices against Data Theft Prefetch Side-Channel Attacks: Bypassing SMAP and Kernel ASLR
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1