强制性披露、股票回报和1964年证券法修正案

M. Greenstone, Annette Vissing-Jorgensen, Paul D. Oyer
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引用次数: 326

摘要

作者:Greenstone, Michael;保罗·E;摘要:1964年《证券法修正案》将1934年以来适用于上市公司的强制性披露要求扩展到场外交易的大型公司。我们发现了几项证据,表明投资者重视这些披露要求,其中两项尤其引人注目。首先,一项公司层面的事件研究表明,受1964年修正案影响最大的场外交易公司在宣布开始遵守新要求后的几周内,其异常超额回报率约为3.5%。其次,我们估计受影响最大的场外交易公司在立法最初提出和生效期间的异常超额回报率在11.1%至22.1%之间。这些回报率根据标准的四个因素进行了调整,并相对于纽交所/美国运通公司,在规模和账面市值比方面匹配,不受立法影响。虽然我们无法确定股东收益中有多少来自这些公司的内部人士,但我们的研究结果表明,强制披露导致管理者更狭隘地关注股东价值最大化。
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Mandated Disclosure, Stock Returns, and the 1964 Securities Acts Amendments
Author(s): Greenstone, Michael; Oyer, Paul E; Vissing-Jorgensen, Annette | Abstract: The 1964 Securities Acts Amendments extended the mandatory disclosure requirements that had applied to listed firms since 1934 to large firms traded Over-the-Counter (OTC). We find several pieces of evidence indicating that investors valued these disclosure requirements, two of which are particularly striking. First, a firm-level event study reveals that the OTC firms most affected by the 1964 Amendments had abnormal excess returns of about 3.5 percent in the weeks immediately surrounding the announcement that they had begun to comply with the new requirements. Second, we estimate that the most affected OTC firms had abnormal excess returns ranging between 11.5 and 22.1 percent in the period between when the legislation was initially proposed and when it went into force. These returns are adjusted for the standard four factors and are relative to NYSE/AMEX firms, matched on size and book-to-market equity, that were unaffected by the legislation. While we cannot determine how much of shareholders' gains were a transfer from insiders of these same companies, our results suggest that mandatory disclosure causes managers to focus more narrowly on maximizing shareholder value.
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