关于信用卡消费的预测和学习

Liyin Jin, J. Lien, Junji Xiao
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引用次数: 1

摘要

公司通常根据收费结构提供不同的合同,希望区分不同类型的消费者。这种契约要求消费者对自己未来的行为进行估计,以便在价格取决于使用情况的服务契约中进行选择。我们研究了信用卡消费者在两种可能的收费结构中选择的合同选择和服务使用情况:一种是预付一次性费用,不要求消费的卡,另一种是每年收取最低金额的年费,每年可以免除。使用超过16,000个信用卡账户的面板数据,包括合同选择和随后的每月账户使用情况,我们研究了消费者在合同选择中准确预测自己信用卡使用情况的程度,以及他们是否以及如何从事后“错误”的经验中吸取教训。比较之前关于固定费用和基于使用的费用合同选择的文献,我们发现消费者对前瞻性激励的依赖,而不是单一预付款支付方案的内在吸引力。在成为会员的第一年犯了错误之后,消费者根据他们未来的金钱奖励表现出了学习的迹象。然而,总的来说,信用卡损耗而不是支出调整是调整的首选幅度,这表明消费者总体上不愿意在内在幅度上改变他们的产品使用情况,以应对经济处罚。我们还研究了合同选择、教育和财务健康指标之间的关系。受教育程度较低的消费者更容易出现合同选择错误,而合同错误与财务健康状况的负面指标(如滚动债务的月份、分期付款计划的参与和现金预提)之间存在正相关关系。这表明,尽管风险很小,但合同选择错误更普遍地表明了消费者在财务规划方面的困难。
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Prediction and Learning About Credit Card Spending
Firms often offer contracts that vary by fee structures, hoping to differentiate among types of consumers. Such contracts require that consumers make estimates of their own future behavior to choose among service contracts whose prices condition on usage. We study the contract choices and service usage of credit card consumers with a choice between two possible fee structures: a card with an upfront lump-sum fee without spending requirement, and a card with an annual fee which can be waived each year if a minimum amount is charged to the card. Using panel data of over 16,000 credit card accounts, including contract choice and subsequent monthly account usage, we examine the extent to which consumers accurately predict their own credit card usage in their contract choice, and whether and how they learn from their experiences with ex-post ‘mistakes’. Compared the prior literature on fixed fee versus use-based fee contract selection, we find consumer reliance on forward-looking incentives rather than an intrinsic appeal of payment schemes with single upfront payments. Following errors made in the first year of membership, consumers showed evidence of learning according to their future monetary incentives. However, card attrition rather than spending adjustment, was the preferred margin for adjustment in the aggregate, showing an overall unwillingness of consumers to change their product usage on the intrinsic margin in response to financial penalties. We also examine the relationship between contract choice, education and financial health indicators. Consumers with lower education levels had a greater tendency towards contract selection errors, while there is a positive relationship between contract errors and negative indicators of financial health such as months of rolling debt, installment plan participation, and cash advance withdrawals. This suggests that even while the stakes are only small to moderate, contract choice errors are more generally indicative of consumers’ financial planning difficulties.
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