我只是想记录我的步数!阻止Fitbit设备的不必要流量

Andrei Kazlouski, Thomas Marchioro, E. Markatos
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摘要

最近出现的可穿戴健身追踪器引发了人们对其提供的隐私的担忧。特别是,之前的研究表明,相关的健身应用程序可能会联系到意想不到的互联网目的地。在这项工作中,我们识别官方移动Fitbit应用程序及其合作伙伴的第三方连接,并研究是否可以在不妨碍设备基本功能的情况下阻止它们。我们表明,禁用维护良好的封锁列表中包含的域的流量并不会阻止Fitbit追踪器正确报告活动数据,包括步数、锻炼、持续时间和睡眠质量等。此外,我们证明了在使用上述阻断规则时,Fitbit的6个伙伴应用程序的Fitbit活动数据是正确同步的。我们的研究结果表明,超过第三方的fitbit相关应用程序包含在可信的基于域名的封锁列表中。此外,我们发现所有研究的应用程序可以联系1到20个非必需的第三方。最后,通过默认安装的uBlock Origin -普遍使用的内容过滤器(adblocker)来识别被阻止的目的地。与之前阻止不必要的物联网通信的工作不同,我们的方法可以很容易地被最终用户使用。
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I just wanted to track my steps! Blocking unwanted traffic of Fitbit devices
The recent advent of wearable fitness trackers has fueled concerns in regards to the privacy they provide. In particular, previous works have indicated that the associated fitness apps may contact unexpected Internet destinations. In this work we identify the third-party connections of the official mobile Fitbit application and its partners, and study whether they can be blocked without hindering the essential functionality of the devices. We show that disabling traffic to the domains contained in well-maintained blocklists does not prevent Fitbit trackers from correctly reporting activity data, including steps, workouts, duration and quality of sleep, etc. Moreover, we demonstrate that Fitbit activity data are correctly synchronized for 6 partner apps of Fitbit when utilizing the above blocking rules. Our results suggest that more than of the third parties for the Fitbit-associated apps are contained in credible domain-based blocklists. Furthermore, we find all studied app to contact between 1 and 20 non-required third parties. Finally, over of the blocked destinations are identified by the default installation of uBlock Origin – universally used content filter (adblocker). Unlike previous works on blocking unnecessary IoT communications, our methodology can be easily utilized by end-users.
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