码注入攻击的侧信道参数特征

Ehsan Aerabi, M. Kaykha, M. Fazeli, A. Patooghy, A. Akbari
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引用次数: 0

摘要

嵌入式系统是近年来代码注入攻击的潜在目标。软件保护机制和一般的计算机通常不适用于嵌入式系统,因为它们具有有限的资源,如内存和处理能力。本文研究了嵌入式系统的侧信道特性及其在代码注入攻击检测中的适用性。在基准测试上对执行时间、功耗和温度的体系结构模拟表明,这些参数揭示了攻击情况下有意义且可区分的行为。
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Side channel parameter characteristics of code injection attacks
Embedded systems are suggestive targets for code injection attacks in the recent years. Software protection mechanisms, and in general computers, are not usually applicable in embedded systems since they have limited resources like memory and process power. In this paper we investigate side channel characteristics of embedded systems and their applicability in code injection attack detection. The architectural simulation for execution time, power usage and temperature on benchmarks shows that these parameters disclose meaningful and distinguishable behaviours in case of attack.
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