加拿大最高法院关于《宪章》平等权利的判例法中的人的尊严概念

T. Vasilieva
{"title":"加拿大最高法院关于《宪章》平等权利的判例法中的人的尊严概念","authors":"T. Vasilieva","doi":"10.21128/1812-7126-2021-5-118-137","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This article explores the evolution of the Supreme Court of Canada’s approach to the application of the concept of human dignity in constitutional equality cases. Traditionally, in human rights cases, this concept serves only to strengthen the argument, to show that the violation affects the person’s intrinsic worth. It is only in Canada and in South Africa that there is experience in applying the concept as a criterion for identifying discrimination. In 1999, in Law v. Canada, the Supreme Court recognized the purpose of Article 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms of 1982 to be the protection of human dignity and stated that discrimination must be established based on assessment of the impact of a program or law on human dignity. However, in 2008, in R. v. Kapp, the Court noted that the application of the concept of human dignity creates difficulties and places an additional burden of prove on the plaintiff. It is no coincidence that victims of discrimination have preferred to seek protection before human rights tribunals and commissions, where the dignity-based test is not used. Subsequently, the Supreme Court of Canada rejected the use of the concept of human dignity as a criterion for identifying discrimination. The unsuccessful experience of applying the concept of human dignity as legal test has demonstrated that not every theoretically correct legal construction is effective in adjudication.","PeriodicalId":113514,"journal":{"name":"Sravnitel noe konstitucionnoe obozrenie","volume":"86 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The concept of human dignity in the case-law of the Supreme Court of Canada on Charter Equality Rights\",\"authors\":\"T. Vasilieva\",\"doi\":\"10.21128/1812-7126-2021-5-118-137\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This article explores the evolution of the Supreme Court of Canada’s approach to the application of the concept of human dignity in constitutional equality cases. Traditionally, in human rights cases, this concept serves only to strengthen the argument, to show that the violation affects the person’s intrinsic worth. It is only in Canada and in South Africa that there is experience in applying the concept as a criterion for identifying discrimination. In 1999, in Law v. Canada, the Supreme Court recognized the purpose of Article 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms of 1982 to be the protection of human dignity and stated that discrimination must be established based on assessment of the impact of a program or law on human dignity. However, in 2008, in R. v. Kapp, the Court noted that the application of the concept of human dignity creates difficulties and places an additional burden of prove on the plaintiff. It is no coincidence that victims of discrimination have preferred to seek protection before human rights tribunals and commissions, where the dignity-based test is not used. Subsequently, the Supreme Court of Canada rejected the use of the concept of human dignity as a criterion for identifying discrimination. The unsuccessful experience of applying the concept of human dignity as legal test has demonstrated that not every theoretically correct legal construction is effective in adjudication.\",\"PeriodicalId\":113514,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Sravnitel noe konstitucionnoe obozrenie\",\"volume\":\"86 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"1900-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Sravnitel noe konstitucionnoe obozrenie\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.21128/1812-7126-2021-5-118-137\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Sravnitel noe konstitucionnoe obozrenie","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.21128/1812-7126-2021-5-118-137","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

本文探讨了加拿大最高法院在宪法平等案件中适用人的尊严概念的方法的演变。传统上,在人权案件中,这一概念只会加强论点,表明侵犯行为影响到人的内在价值。只有在加拿大和南非才有应用这一概念作为确定歧视的标准的经验。1999年,在Law诉加拿大一案中,最高法院承认1982年《加拿大权利与自由宪章》第15(1)条的目的是保护人的尊严,并指出,歧视必须建立在评估一项计划或法律对人的尊严的影响的基础上。然而,在2008年的R. v. Kapp案中,最高法院指出,人类尊严概念的适用带来了困难,并给原告带来了额外的举证负担。并非巧合的是,歧视受害者倾向于向人权法庭和委员会寻求保护,因为这些法庭和委员会不使用以尊严为基础的检验标准。随后,加拿大最高法院拒绝使用人类尊严的概念作为确定歧视的标准。将人的尊严概念作为法律检验的失败经验表明,并非每一种理论上正确的法律建构在审判中都是有效的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
The concept of human dignity in the case-law of the Supreme Court of Canada on Charter Equality Rights
This article explores the evolution of the Supreme Court of Canada’s approach to the application of the concept of human dignity in constitutional equality cases. Traditionally, in human rights cases, this concept serves only to strengthen the argument, to show that the violation affects the person’s intrinsic worth. It is only in Canada and in South Africa that there is experience in applying the concept as a criterion for identifying discrimination. In 1999, in Law v. Canada, the Supreme Court recognized the purpose of Article 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms of 1982 to be the protection of human dignity and stated that discrimination must be established based on assessment of the impact of a program or law on human dignity. However, in 2008, in R. v. Kapp, the Court noted that the application of the concept of human dignity creates difficulties and places an additional burden of prove on the plaintiff. It is no coincidence that victims of discrimination have preferred to seek protection before human rights tribunals and commissions, where the dignity-based test is not used. Subsequently, the Supreme Court of Canada rejected the use of the concept of human dignity as a criterion for identifying discrimination. The unsuccessful experience of applying the concept of human dignity as legal test has demonstrated that not every theoretically correct legal construction is effective in adjudication.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
期刊最新文献
Review of legal reasoning in the Russian Constitutional Court judgments: Nos. 49‑P – 50‑P (2020), Nos. 1-P – 3-P (2021) Public hearings as an institution of deliberative democracy in major Russian and American cities Is it time to understand Russia rationally? Test of suitability in constitutional adjudication Specificity of the interpretation of constitutionality in the Fifth Republic in France Review of legal reasoning in the Russian Constitutional Court rulings Nos.1638-O, 1640-O-Р, 1642-O, 1643-O, 1644-O, 1641-O (2020)
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1