{"title":"加拿大最高法院关于《宪章》平等权利的判例法中的人的尊严概念","authors":"T. Vasilieva","doi":"10.21128/1812-7126-2021-5-118-137","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This article explores the evolution of the Supreme Court of Canada’s approach to the application of the concept of human dignity in constitutional equality cases. Traditionally, in human rights cases, this concept serves only to strengthen the argument, to show that the violation affects the person’s intrinsic worth. It is only in Canada and in South Africa that there is experience in applying the concept as a criterion for identifying discrimination. In 1999, in Law v. Canada, the Supreme Court recognized the purpose of Article 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms of 1982 to be the protection of human dignity and stated that discrimination must be established based on assessment of the impact of a program or law on human dignity. However, in 2008, in R. v. Kapp, the Court noted that the application of the concept of human dignity creates difficulties and places an additional burden of prove on the plaintiff. It is no coincidence that victims of discrimination have preferred to seek protection before human rights tribunals and commissions, where the dignity-based test is not used. Subsequently, the Supreme Court of Canada rejected the use of the concept of human dignity as a criterion for identifying discrimination. The unsuccessful experience of applying the concept of human dignity as legal test has demonstrated that not every theoretically correct legal construction is effective in adjudication.","PeriodicalId":113514,"journal":{"name":"Sravnitel noe konstitucionnoe obozrenie","volume":"86 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The concept of human dignity in the case-law of the Supreme Court of Canada on Charter Equality Rights\",\"authors\":\"T. Vasilieva\",\"doi\":\"10.21128/1812-7126-2021-5-118-137\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This article explores the evolution of the Supreme Court of Canada’s approach to the application of the concept of human dignity in constitutional equality cases. Traditionally, in human rights cases, this concept serves only to strengthen the argument, to show that the violation affects the person’s intrinsic worth. It is only in Canada and in South Africa that there is experience in applying the concept as a criterion for identifying discrimination. In 1999, in Law v. Canada, the Supreme Court recognized the purpose of Article 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms of 1982 to be the protection of human dignity and stated that discrimination must be established based on assessment of the impact of a program or law on human dignity. However, in 2008, in R. v. Kapp, the Court noted that the application of the concept of human dignity creates difficulties and places an additional burden of prove on the plaintiff. It is no coincidence that victims of discrimination have preferred to seek protection before human rights tribunals and commissions, where the dignity-based test is not used. Subsequently, the Supreme Court of Canada rejected the use of the concept of human dignity as a criterion for identifying discrimination. The unsuccessful experience of applying the concept of human dignity as legal test has demonstrated that not every theoretically correct legal construction is effective in adjudication.\",\"PeriodicalId\":113514,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Sravnitel noe konstitucionnoe obozrenie\",\"volume\":\"86 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"1900-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Sravnitel noe konstitucionnoe obozrenie\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.21128/1812-7126-2021-5-118-137\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Sravnitel noe konstitucionnoe obozrenie","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.21128/1812-7126-2021-5-118-137","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
摘要
本文探讨了加拿大最高法院在宪法平等案件中适用人的尊严概念的方法的演变。传统上,在人权案件中,这一概念只会加强论点,表明侵犯行为影响到人的内在价值。只有在加拿大和南非才有应用这一概念作为确定歧视的标准的经验。1999年,在Law诉加拿大一案中,最高法院承认1982年《加拿大权利与自由宪章》第15(1)条的目的是保护人的尊严,并指出,歧视必须建立在评估一项计划或法律对人的尊严的影响的基础上。然而,在2008年的R. v. Kapp案中,最高法院指出,人类尊严概念的适用带来了困难,并给原告带来了额外的举证负担。并非巧合的是,歧视受害者倾向于向人权法庭和委员会寻求保护,因为这些法庭和委员会不使用以尊严为基础的检验标准。随后,加拿大最高法院拒绝使用人类尊严的概念作为确定歧视的标准。将人的尊严概念作为法律检验的失败经验表明,并非每一种理论上正确的法律建构在审判中都是有效的。
The concept of human dignity in the case-law of the Supreme Court of Canada on Charter Equality Rights
This article explores the evolution of the Supreme Court of Canada’s approach to the application of the concept of human dignity in constitutional equality cases. Traditionally, in human rights cases, this concept serves only to strengthen the argument, to show that the violation affects the person’s intrinsic worth. It is only in Canada and in South Africa that there is experience in applying the concept as a criterion for identifying discrimination. In 1999, in Law v. Canada, the Supreme Court recognized the purpose of Article 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms of 1982 to be the protection of human dignity and stated that discrimination must be established based on assessment of the impact of a program or law on human dignity. However, in 2008, in R. v. Kapp, the Court noted that the application of the concept of human dignity creates difficulties and places an additional burden of prove on the plaintiff. It is no coincidence that victims of discrimination have preferred to seek protection before human rights tribunals and commissions, where the dignity-based test is not used. Subsequently, the Supreme Court of Canada rejected the use of the concept of human dignity as a criterion for identifying discrimination. The unsuccessful experience of applying the concept of human dignity as legal test has demonstrated that not every theoretically correct legal construction is effective in adjudication.