私人自愿核证计划的成效:管治成本方法

Thomas Dietz, Jennie Auffenberg
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引用次数: 1

摘要

在什么条件下,像热带雨林联盟或公平贸易这样的私人自愿认证项目才能成功地提高环境和社会标准?我们认为,认证计划的有效性取决于三个变量:可持续性标准、执行机制和市场扩散。标准越严格,执行体系越完善,市场份额越大,特定认证项目的实际影响就越高。我们开发了一个指数,系统地比较了全球咖啡行业中一系列重要认证计划的规范和执行系统的优势,并收集了有关其市场份额的数据。我们使用定性比较分析(QCA)来分析这些数据。我们的研究结果表明:具有严格标准和执行体系的认证方案所占的市场份额微不足道。市场份额较大的认证制度要么标准松散,要么执行制度无效。我们开发了一种治理成本方法来解释这些发现。更严格的标准和执行系统导致生产成本的增加。这些成本转移到市场的程度是有限的。因此,核证制度有减少这些费用以增加其市场份额的动机。结果证实,自愿治理方案的能力受到系统限制。
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The Efficacy of Private Voluntary Certification Schemes: A Governance Costs Approach
What are the conditions under which private, voluntary certification programs like the Rainforest Alliance or Fairtrade can successfully promote environmental and social standards? We propose that the efficacy of a certification program depends on three variables: its sustainability standards, enforcement mechanisms and its market proliferation. The stricter the standards, the better the enforcement systems and the bigger the market share, the higher will be the factual impact of a particular certification program. We develop an index to systematically compare the strengths of norms and enforcement systems across a selection of important certification schemes in the global coffee industry and collect data about their market shares. We use a qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) to analyze these data. Our results show: certification schemes with strict standards and enforcement systems possess only insignificant market shares. Certification schemes with more significant market shares have either loose standards and/or ineffective enforcement systems. We develop a governance costs approach to explain these findings. Stricter standards and enforcement systems lead to an increase of production costs. The extents to which these costs can be shifted to the market are limited. Certification schemes therefore have incentives to reduce these costs in order to increase their market shares. The results confirm that the capacity of voluntary governance schemes is systematically restricted.
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