责任股与共同责任:为负责任的公司管理人员责任辩护

Amy J. Sepinwall
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引用次数: 2

摘要

当一家公司犯罪时,我们可以追究谁的刑事责任?一组明显的被告包括代表公司犯罪的个人。但根据责任公司官员(RCO)原则,政府也可以起诉和惩罚那些公司高管,尽管他们可能缺乏“不法行为意识”,但仍然“在促进法规禁止的交易中负有责任”。换句话说,根据RCO原则,公司高管可以为其公司的犯罪行为承担刑事责任,而她既没有参与也没有责任阻止。只要有关高管有权阻止企业犯罪,但却没有这样做,她就有可能成为刑事诉讼的目标。RCO学说显然对我们对刑事罪责的传统理解提出了挑战,根据这种理解,罪责是个人的——一个人可能只对他个人犯下的错误负责,而且只有当他带着有罪的心态这样做的时候。因此,RCO责任虽然代表了最常见的严格刑事责任,但却被认为“与我们刑事司法系统的基本概念不一致”,并被比作原始的弗兰克保证原则,在该原则下,一个群体的无辜成员可能会因其同伴的不法行为而受到惩罚。另一方面,企业犯罪具有不可简化的集体性方面。如果我们认真对待这方面,就像本文所做的那样,那么脱离个人罪责的范式可能是合理的。特别是,我们可能有理由不仅将责任分配给公司犯罪的直接肇事者,还将责任分配给犯罪发生时在公司内担任要职的人,这种责任可能正是RCO原则所考虑的那种刑事责任。本文试图确定在何种情况下这种责任的延伸是允许的,以及其允许的理由。更具体地说,本文试图通过论证这些错误地将其解释为一种过失责任来批判该原则的现有理由,并在这样做时剥夺了该原则的变革力量。接下来,这篇论文为个人的罪责不是必要的学说提供了辩护。然后,本文反驳了对这一学说的反对意见,认为我们不需要为了避免批评者的关注而完全抛弃这一学说。相反,我们需要的是一套防止误用或滥用教义的指导方针。本文最后对这些指导方针进行了说明。
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Responsible Shares and Shared Responsibility: In Defense of Responsible Corporate Officer Liability
When a corporation commits a crime, whom may we hold criminally liable? One obvious set of defendants consists of the individuals who perpetrated the crime on the corporation's behalf. But according to the responsible corporate officer (RCO) doctrine, the government may also prosecute and punish those corporate executives who, although perhaps lacking "consciousness of wrongdoing," nonetheless have "a responsible share in the furtherance of the transaction which the statute outlaws." In other words, under the RCO doctrine, a corporate executive can come to bear criminal responsibility for an offense of her corporation that she neither participated in nor culpably failed to prevent. Just so long as the executive in question had the authority to prevent the corporate crime and failed to do so, she may be targeted in a criminal suit.The RCO doctrine plainly poses a challenge to our traditional understanding of criminal culpability, according to which guilt is individual -- one may be held responsible only for a wrong one has personally committed, and only if one has done so with a guilty mind. Thus, RCO liability, while representing the most common instance of strict criminal liability, has been deemed "at odds with fundamental notions of our criminal justice system," and likened to the primitive doctrine of Frankpledge, under which innocent members of a group could be punished for the wrongful deed of one of their fellows. On the other hand, corporate crimes have an irreducibly collective aspect. If we take this aspect seriously, as this paper does, then departures from the paradigm of individual culpability may well be warranted. In particular, we may be justified in assigning responsibility not just to the corporate crime's immediate perpetrators but also to those who held prominent positions within the corporation at the time of the crime's occurrence, and this responsibility may license just the kind of criminal liability that the RCO doctrine contemplates. This paper seeks to determine the circumstances under which this extension of responsibility is permissible, and the grounds of its permissibility.More specifically, the paper seeks to critique existing justifications for the doctrine by arguing that these mistakenly construe it as a kind of negligence liability, and in so doing deprive the doctrine of its transformative power. The paper next offers a defense of the doctrine according to which personal guilt is not necessary. The paper then contends with objections to the doctrine, arguing that we need not dispense with the doctrine altogether in order to avoid the concerns of its critics. What is needed instead is a set of guidelines that ensure against the doctrine's misuse or abuse. The paper ends with a specification of these guidelines.
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