{"title":"贝叶斯因子与后验估计:同一枚硬币的两面","authors":"Harlan Campbell, P. Gustafson","doi":"10.1080/00031305.2022.2139293","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Recently, several researchers have claimed that conclusions obtained from a Bayes factor (or the posterior odds) may contradict those obtained from Bayesian posterior estimation. In this article, we wish to point out that no such “contradiction” exists if one is willing to consistently define one’s priors and posteriors. The key for congruence is that the (implied) prior model odds used for testing are the same as those used for estimation. Our recommendation is simple: If one reports a Bayes factor comparing two models, then one should also report posterior estimates which appropriately acknowledge the uncertainty with regards to which of the two models is correct.","PeriodicalId":342642,"journal":{"name":"The American Statistician","volume":"107 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2022-04-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"5","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Bayes Factors and Posterior Estimation: Two Sides of the Very Same Coin\",\"authors\":\"Harlan Campbell, P. Gustafson\",\"doi\":\"10.1080/00031305.2022.2139293\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Abstract Recently, several researchers have claimed that conclusions obtained from a Bayes factor (or the posterior odds) may contradict those obtained from Bayesian posterior estimation. In this article, we wish to point out that no such “contradiction” exists if one is willing to consistently define one’s priors and posteriors. The key for congruence is that the (implied) prior model odds used for testing are the same as those used for estimation. Our recommendation is simple: If one reports a Bayes factor comparing two models, then one should also report posterior estimates which appropriately acknowledge the uncertainty with regards to which of the two models is correct.\",\"PeriodicalId\":342642,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"The American Statistician\",\"volume\":\"107 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-04-12\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"5\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"The American Statistician\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1080/00031305.2022.2139293\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"The American Statistician","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00031305.2022.2139293","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Bayes Factors and Posterior Estimation: Two Sides of the Very Same Coin
Abstract Recently, several researchers have claimed that conclusions obtained from a Bayes factor (or the posterior odds) may contradict those obtained from Bayesian posterior estimation. In this article, we wish to point out that no such “contradiction” exists if one is willing to consistently define one’s priors and posteriors. The key for congruence is that the (implied) prior model odds used for testing are the same as those used for estimation. Our recommendation is simple: If one reports a Bayes factor comparing two models, then one should also report posterior estimates which appropriately acknowledge the uncertainty with regards to which of the two models is correct.