相持行动II

D. C. Hodges
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摘要

摘要:相持行动II于1944年9月15日实施,目的是夺取太平洋上的帕劳群岛。这次行动的主要目的是防止日军在麦克阿瑟在菲律宾指挥作战时攻击他的西翼。海军陆战队第1师率领美军进攻佩琉岛。保卫该岛的是一支坚决的日本士兵,他们在战斗中牺牲,尽可能多地杀死敌人。美国领导层预计这场激烈的战斗不会持续超过3天。经过72天的持续战斗,美军消灭了贝里琉岛上全部13500名日本守军。但胜利者为他们的胜利付出了高昂的代价;敌人造成近万人伤亡,其中死亡或失踪2000多人。“相持行动II”没有达到阻止敌人攻击麦克阿瑟侧翼的主要目的,因为这个目的已经实现了。在帕劳斯的日本军队指挥官没有能力影响在菲律宾针对美国人的行动。在1944年9月15日之前,主要领导人意识到第二次僵局的意图已经实现。尽管了解了这些情况,但由于太平洋地区的军事领导受到低效的指挥结构的阻碍,第二次僵局得以继续进行。效率低下表现为个人和服务之间的争执,资源的竞争,以及在太平洋上对日本军队采取两种截然不同的行动方案的分散执行。这导致重复工作和执行不必要的任务。僵局II就是这样一个不必要的任务。尽管在当时没有必要,但僵局II对今天的联合指挥与控制概念做出了重大贡献。那些参与第二次僵局的人所做出的牺牲继续为美国的现代军事力量带来回报。(1表4图29参考文献)
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Operation Stalemate II
Abstract : Operation Stalemate II was conducted on 15 September 1944 to secure the Palau Islands in the Pacific Ocean. The primary purpose of this operation was to prevent the Japanese from attacking MacArthur's western flank while he conducted operations in the Philippines. The 1st Marine Division led the American attacking force on the tiny island of Peleliu. Defending the island was a resolute force of Japanese soldiers, under orders to die fighting, killing as many of the enemy as they could. American leadership anticipated a sharp fight lasting no more than 3 days. After 72 days of continuous fighting, U.S. forces had eliminated the entire Japanese garrison of 13,500 soldiers on Peleliu. But the victors paid dearly for their win; the enemy inflicted nearly 10,000 casualties, including over 2,000 dead or missing. Operation Stalemate II did not achieve its primary purpose of preventing the enemy from attacking MacArthur's flank because that purpose had already been accomplished. The commander of Japanese forces in the Palaus did not have the ability to influence actions against the Americans in the Philippines. Prior to 15 September 1944, key leadership realized the intent of Stalemate II had already been achieved. Despite this knowledge, Stalemate II was allowed to proceed because military leadership of the Pacific was hampered by an inefficient command structure. The inefficiencies manifested as disputes between personalities and services, competition for resources, and decentralized execution of two distinctly separate courses of action against Japanese forces in the Pacific. This led to duplication of efforts and execution of unnecessary tasks. Stalemate II was one such unnecessary task. Although unnecessary at the time, Stalemate II significantly contributed to today's Joint Command and Control concepts. The sacrifices made by those who participated in Stalemate II continue to pay dividends for America's modern military forces. (1 table, 4 figures, 29 refs.)
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Doctrine, the Tentative Manual, and FTP 167 Back Matter Appendix Operation Stalemate II Operation Galvanic
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