Complicity

This chapter addresses complicity liability. Complicity doctrine is notoriously difficult, both doctrinally and conceptually, in part because its underlying principles are themselves in tension. The pull of judgements about culpability must be reconciled with the demands of criminalization, and with the need protect the public. Frequently, the approach of the courts has been to focus on the defendant’s culpability. The better approach, it is argued, is to distinguish matters of culpability from those of ascriptive responsibility, and to focus also on the latter. Once this is done, it becomes easier to see the centrality of mens rea in ascribing responsibility for another’s acts. Quite apart from helping to show culpability, mens rea requirements can also mediate the constraints of criminalization, helping to balance the ex ante liberties of the accessory against the rights and interests of others; and ensuring those who do otherwise innocent actions have sufficient notice that their conduct is potentially criminal. The chapter closes by distinguishing between two major categories of participation: aiding and abetting, and joint criminal enterprise.