互惠交换转化为腐败行为表现的可能性

Y. Ivashuk
{"title":"互惠交换转化为腐败行为表现的可能性","authors":"Y. Ivashuk","doi":"10.15407/ETET2020.04.065","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Despite all “non-market” nature of reciprocal interactions, it would be excessive to deny the invisible calculation of network transfers, that is, the accountability of the given and the received. In this paper, by combining the historical and the logical, the author establishes that there is a rather fine line between the reciprocal exchange and the types of corruptive behavior. The common components relate to the quality of the basis and the background, which indicates the nature and origin of corruptive practices. The exceptional and unique is manifested in different forms of manifestation of the general. The relations of trust, whose meaning is revealed based on the presented tree of the game, act as the general. The forms of manifestation of corruptive behavior have been distinguished by the method of classification. It has been noted that a reliable \"safeguard\" of opportunistic behavior in reciprocal exchange is a system of strict social standards. If market agreements are ensured by formal sanctions or informal forcible methods, violation of unwritten rules of conduct in the economy of gift exchange is punishable by deprivation of trust, which means excluding the entity that has not lived up to expectations from the network of reciprocal interactions. It has been noted that transaction costs under the conditions of reciprocity are quite low, because the exchange relations are personalized, and the importance of the gift is determined by its subjective value to those to whom the gift is offered. It has been established that on the one hand, the exchange of gifts and incentives within reasonable limits can be a socially acceptable component of successful business relations. However, on the other hand, if a person is authorized to perform state functions, a gift may be offered to him/her for the purpose of bribery and/or incitement to abuse of power. Since the top-down fight against corruption, as a rule, does not affect those stable and dominant stereotypes of public consciousness, standards and values that have been nurtured for decades and even hundreds of years. Thus, when developing policies to minimize corruption, it is recommended to use the methodology and results of research in the field of behavioral economics, which determines the promising areas for research on this issue.","PeriodicalId":209799,"journal":{"name":"Ekonomìčna teorìâ","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-12-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Possibility of the transformation of reciprocal exchange into manifestations of corruptive behaviour\",\"authors\":\"Y. Ivashuk\",\"doi\":\"10.15407/ETET2020.04.065\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Despite all “non-market” nature of reciprocal interactions, it would be excessive to deny the invisible calculation of network transfers, that is, the accountability of the given and the received. In this paper, by combining the historical and the logical, the author establishes that there is a rather fine line between the reciprocal exchange and the types of corruptive behavior. The common components relate to the quality of the basis and the background, which indicates the nature and origin of corruptive practices. The exceptional and unique is manifested in different forms of manifestation of the general. The relations of trust, whose meaning is revealed based on the presented tree of the game, act as the general. The forms of manifestation of corruptive behavior have been distinguished by the method of classification. It has been noted that a reliable \\\"safeguard\\\" of opportunistic behavior in reciprocal exchange is a system of strict social standards. If market agreements are ensured by formal sanctions or informal forcible methods, violation of unwritten rules of conduct in the economy of gift exchange is punishable by deprivation of trust, which means excluding the entity that has not lived up to expectations from the network of reciprocal interactions. It has been noted that transaction costs under the conditions of reciprocity are quite low, because the exchange relations are personalized, and the importance of the gift is determined by its subjective value to those to whom the gift is offered. It has been established that on the one hand, the exchange of gifts and incentives within reasonable limits can be a socially acceptable component of successful business relations. However, on the other hand, if a person is authorized to perform state functions, a gift may be offered to him/her for the purpose of bribery and/or incitement to abuse of power. Since the top-down fight against corruption, as a rule, does not affect those stable and dominant stereotypes of public consciousness, standards and values that have been nurtured for decades and even hundreds of years. Thus, when developing policies to minimize corruption, it is recommended to use the methodology and results of research in the field of behavioral economics, which determines the promising areas for research on this issue.\",\"PeriodicalId\":209799,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Ekonomìčna teorìâ\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-12-30\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Ekonomìčna teorìâ\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.15407/ETET2020.04.065\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Ekonomìčna teorìâ","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.15407/ETET2020.04.065","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

尽管互惠互动的所有“非市场”性质,否认网络转移的无形计算,即给予和接受的责任,将是过度的。本文结合历史与逻辑,确立了互惠交换与腐败行为类型之间的微妙界限。共同组成部分涉及基础和背景的质量,这表明了腐败行为的性质和起源。例外和独特的表现形式是不同的,一般的表现形式。信任关系是博弈的一般关系,其意义是根据博弈的树状图来揭示的。用分类的方法对腐败行为的表现形式进行了区分。有人指出,在互惠交换中,对机会主义行为的可靠“保障”是一种严格的社会标准制度。如果市场协议是通过正式制裁或非正式的强制手段来确保的,那么在礼品交换经济中违反不成文的行为规则将受到剥夺信任的惩罚,这意味着将没有达到期望的实体排除在相互作用的网络之外。有人指出,互惠条件下的交易成本很低,因为交换关系是个性化的,礼物的重要性是由礼物对受赠者的主观价值决定的。人们已经确定,一方面,在合理范围内交换礼物和奖励可以成为成功商业关系的社会可接受的组成部分。但是,另一方面,如果一个人被授权执行国家职能,则可以向他/她提供礼物,目的是贿赂和/或煽动滥用权力。由于自上而下的反腐败斗争,通常不会影响几十年甚至几百年来形成的那些稳定的、占主导地位的公众意识、标准和价值观。因此,在制定最小化腐败的政策时,建议使用行为经济学领域的研究方法和结果,这决定了该问题的研究前景。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
Possibility of the transformation of reciprocal exchange into manifestations of corruptive behaviour
Despite all “non-market” nature of reciprocal interactions, it would be excessive to deny the invisible calculation of network transfers, that is, the accountability of the given and the received. In this paper, by combining the historical and the logical, the author establishes that there is a rather fine line between the reciprocal exchange and the types of corruptive behavior. The common components relate to the quality of the basis and the background, which indicates the nature and origin of corruptive practices. The exceptional and unique is manifested in different forms of manifestation of the general. The relations of trust, whose meaning is revealed based on the presented tree of the game, act as the general. The forms of manifestation of corruptive behavior have been distinguished by the method of classification. It has been noted that a reliable "safeguard" of opportunistic behavior in reciprocal exchange is a system of strict social standards. If market agreements are ensured by formal sanctions or informal forcible methods, violation of unwritten rules of conduct in the economy of gift exchange is punishable by deprivation of trust, which means excluding the entity that has not lived up to expectations from the network of reciprocal interactions. It has been noted that transaction costs under the conditions of reciprocity are quite low, because the exchange relations are personalized, and the importance of the gift is determined by its subjective value to those to whom the gift is offered. It has been established that on the one hand, the exchange of gifts and incentives within reasonable limits can be a socially acceptable component of successful business relations. However, on the other hand, if a person is authorized to perform state functions, a gift may be offered to him/her for the purpose of bribery and/or incitement to abuse of power. Since the top-down fight against corruption, as a rule, does not affect those stable and dominant stereotypes of public consciousness, standards and values that have been nurtured for decades and even hundreds of years. Thus, when developing policies to minimize corruption, it is recommended to use the methodology and results of research in the field of behavioral economics, which determines the promising areas for research on this issue.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
期刊最新文献
Economic pragmatism: political-economy essence, antipodes and imitation A classical ancient polis: the power-holding group and the features of exchange and appropriation Oligopoly control and unification of quantitative indexes to control different types of monopoly Strategic planning as a way of public administration Value-based work motivation: the East Asian experience
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1